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ARTICLE

THE TROUBLE WITH TACKING:
A RECONSIDERATION OF
TRADEMARK PRIORITY
Alan L. Durham*
ABSTRACT

When trademarks cannot co-exist because they are
confusingly similar, priority generally depends upon first use.
However, through the practice known as "tacking," the junior user
can sometimes prevail based on its earlier adoption of a similar,
but technically distinct trademark. The Supreme Court recently
determined that tacking is a question of fact to be resolved by a
jury, under the guidance of "careful jury instructions that make
[the] standard clear." Courts say the standard for tacking is
"exceedingly strict," and that tacking is allowed only when the
earlier mark and the revised mark are so similar that they convey
the "same commercial impression," and consumers would regard
both as "the same mark." In practice, this standard is not "clear,"
nor is it rooted in sound policy justifications. In fact, it could often
hamper competition, deny consumers useful information, and lead
to the very sorts of confusion that the trademark laws are intended
to prevent. This Article proposes, as an alternative, a standard for
tacking based on a comparison of the original and the revised
trademarks to the intervening mark, the question being whether
the changes did or did not contribute to the potential for confusion.

Judge Robert S. Vance Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
*
J.D. 1988, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Dean Mark Brandon for
supporting my research.
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INTRODUCTION

Generally speaking, when competing parties adopt the same or
confusingly similar trademarks, the rights of the first party to use
its mark in commerce are superior to those of the latecomer.1 But in
rare instances a party claiming seniority may rely on its earlier use
of a similar trademark that is "technically distinct." 2 When this is
permitted, the party is said to "tack on" the period when it used the
earlier mark, thereby establishing priority over the competing
mark.3 For example, if A and B both use the mark AMERICAN

1.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015) ("Rights in a trademark
are determined by the date of the mark's first use in commerce. The party who first uses a
mark in commerce is said to have priority over other users.").
2.
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th
Cir. 1999).
3.
See The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1635
(T.T.A.B. 2007) (using the "tack on" terminology). In Hana, the Supreme Court
characterized tacking as "cloth[ing] a new mark with the priority position of an older mark."
Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 909.
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SECURITY BANK, 4 and B was first to use that mark in commerce,
A might still prevail as the senior user, with the power to prevent
B's use, if A had earlier used the words AMERICAN SECURITY
alone.5 "Tacking" requires that the earlier and later versions of the
senior party's mark be very similar.6
In 2015, the Supreme Court, resolving a circuit split, held that
whether the earlier and later versions of a mark are similar
enough to permit tacking is a question of fact "fall[ing] comfortably
within the ken of a jury."7 This is so because the standard, which
neither party questioned,8 is whether the earlier and later versions
of the mark convey the "same, continuing commercial impression,"
9
such that consumers would consider them "the same mark."
These are matters to be regarded "through the eyes of a
consumer."1 0 Should anyone worry that a jury might apply the
standard incorrectly, "the solution is to craft careful jury
instructions that make that standard clear.""
The time is ripe, therefore, to consider whether the prevailing
tacking standard is sufficient to form the basis of those clear jury
instructions and, more fundamentally, whether that standard
actually achieves results consistent with sound trademark policy.
The "commercial impression" and "same mark" language leaves
room for ambiguity. If the standard is often not difficult to apply,
that is only because courts tell us that it is to be so rarely applied.
Courts have described tacking, almost universally, as subject to an
"exceedingly strict" standard,1 2 and tolerated only in "rare
instances."1 3 Oddly, while tacking itself has been explained in

This Article adopts the convention of printing word marks and portions of word
4.
marks in all capital letters.
The source of this example is Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Sec. & Tr. Co., 571 F.2d 564,
5.
567 (C.C.P.A. 1978), a case where tacking was permitted.
Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 910 ("The marks must create the same, continuing commercial
6.
impression, and the later mark should not materially differ from or alter the character of
the mark attempted to be tacked.").
Id. at 910-11.
7.
Id. at 910 n.1.
8.
9.
Id. at 910 (quoting Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156,
1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Id. (quoting DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Enviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d
10.
1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:26 (4th ed. 2016) ("[L]ike most issues in trademark law,
whether the same commercial impression is maintained is a question of fact to be
determined from the perspective of the ordinary purchaser.").
Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 911-12.
11.
See, e.g., Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2006);
12.
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048-49 (9th Cir.
1999).
See, e.g., Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1160, abrogatedby Hana, 135 S. Ct. 907.
13.
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terms of the interests of both trademark owners and consumers,' 4
the guiding principle of rarity has not been justified except by
reliance on precedent. In fact, the strict standard currently applied
may operate against the interests of both trademark owners and
consumers.
A standard for tacking based on good trademark policy might
look significantly different. This Article proposes that where two
trademark owners are competing for priority, a jury should not
simply compare the earlier and later versions of the altered mark
to determine if the differences affect the commercial impression
they convey. Instead, the jury should examine the alterations in
the context of the competing mark to see if they did or did not
contribute to any likelihood of confusion. In comparison to the
current approach to tacking, this approach would give trademark
owners more freedom to conform their trademark identities to the
demands of the marketplace, allow trademark owners to supply
additional and more accurate information to consumers through
their trademarks, and minimize the potential for consumer
confusion-the latter being the primary goal of trademark law in
general.1 5
Part II of this Article describes the concept of tacking. It
discusses instances in which trademark owners have altered their
marks by additions, subtractions, or substitutions-sometimes in
a manner subtle enough to permit tacking, but more often in ways
that disrupt the continuity of the mark. Part II also discusses the
variety of contexts in which courts have applied the tacking
standard. Part III examines the exceedingly strict requirements of
tacking based on a "continuing commercial impression." It
considers both the ambiguities latent in the prevailing standard
and the absence of convincing policy justifications. Part IV
suggests that tacking should be re-imagined when applied in the
context of competing marks. Rather than simply comparing the
earlier and revised versions of the altered mark, the fact-finder
should determine whether the changes contributed to the
potential for confusion. This approach would give trademark
owners more freedom to update their brand identities, while
providing consumers with better information and a marketplace
less prone to confusion.
14.
See Quicksilver, 466 F.3d at 758; George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd.,
575 F.3d 383, 392-93 (4th Cir. 2009).
15.
See E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2008) (referring to "the purpose of trademark law" as "to 'avoid confusion in the
marketplace by allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from duping consumers into
buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark owner' (citation
omitted)).

2017]

THE TROUBLE WITH TACKING
II.

A.

1031

TACKING TRADEMARKS TO ESTABLISH PRIORITY

Background

A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device" used to
identify the brand origin of goods and to distinguish them from the
goods of others. 16 A word or phrase (like NIKE or JUST DO IT) may
serve as a trademark if it is not generic or merely descriptive.' 7
Designs and graphics (like Nike's check-mark-resembling "swoosh"
symbol) also qualify as trademarks if they indicate brand origin.' 8
Even the design of a product can serve as a trademark, if the design
is non-functional and has acquired meaning as an indicator of
source.1 9 Trademarks supply consumers with information about the
origin of the goods and, often, their quality as well. 2 0

16.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Technically, trademarks and service marks are distinct.
Trademarks identify the origin of goods; service marks identify the origin of services. See
Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). For most purposes,
and for the purposes of this Article, service marks may be treated as simply a species of
trademark. See id. ("Service marks and trademarks are governed by identical standards.").
17.
Trademarks are categorized by their place on a spectrum of distinctiveness. See
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992); Bos. Duck Tours, LP
v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12-14 (1st Cir. 2008); Miller Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977). The strongest trademarks are
fanciful (terms invented specifically to serve as trademarks, like KODAK), or arbitrary
(terms not associated with the goods except as an indication of brand origin, like
PENGUIN books). See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §§ 11:5, 11:11; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000) (providing examples of fanciful and
arbitrary marks); Miller, 561 F.2d at 79 ("An arbitrary or fanciful term ... is far enough
removed from the merely descriptive not to be vulnerable to possible attack as being
merely descriptive rather than suggestive."). Suggestive marks refer indirectly to the
qualities of the goods but require some imagination to make the connection (e.g.,
COPPERTONE sun tan lotion). George, 575 F.3d at 394. Fanciful, arbitrary and
suggestive marks are all "inherently distinctive," meaning that no evidence is required
to establish that they indicate brand origin rather than other qualities of the goods with
which they are associated. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 771; Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic
Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1994). Descriptive marks (like CHUNKY SOUP)
more literally reflect the qualities of the goods themselves. These can be reserved as
trademarks only with evidence of "secondary meaning"-evidence, that is, that
consumers have come to understand, through advertising or otherwise, that the terms
are primarily indicators of brand origin. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)-(f); Leelanau Wine
Cellars v. Black & Red, 502 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). Generic terms refer to certain
categories of goods (like "light beer") and cannot be reserved as trademarks at all. See
Miller, 561 F.2d at 79-80; Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143
(2d Cir. 1997). Although these categories have important legal consequences, their
boundaries cannot be drawn with certainty. They "tend to blur at the edges and merge
together." Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir.
1983).
18.
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:24 ("Any picture, design or symbol may be
capable of playing the role of a trademark . . . ."). McCarthy uses the Chevrolet "bowtie"
graphic as an example of a well-known design trademark. Id. § 7:25.
19.
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211-12, 216.
20.
See George, 575 F.3d at 392 ("A trademark puts the purchasing public on notice
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The owner of a trademark can prevent the use of a similar
mark where such use is likely to cause confusion among
consumers. 21 Determining whether confusion is likely depends on
consideration of a number of factors. 22 Typically these include:
(1) the strength and distinctiveness of the plaintiffs mark; 23 (2) the
similarity of the marks in sight, sound and meaning; 24 (3) the
similarity of the plaintiffs and defendant's goods; (4) any evidence
of actual confusion, whether anecdotal or produced through
consumer surveys; 25 (5) the defendant's intent; (6) the similarity of
the trade channels through which the plaintiffs and defendant's
goods are advertised and sold; and (7) the sophistication and
attentiveness of the consumer. 26 In a particular case, some factors
may be more important than others. 27
The avoidance of confusion protects consumers who might
otherwise purchase unwanted goods, or who at the very least
would be required to invest more time and resources to identify
the goods they desire. 28 The avoidance of confusion also protects
trademark owners, ensuring that their investments in good will

that all goods bearing the trademark: (1) originated from the same source; and (2) are of
equal quality.").
21.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); George, 575 F.3d at 393.
22.
For lists of some of the factors commonly considered, see, e.g., Tana v. Dantanna's,
611 F.3d 767, 774-75 (11th Cir. 2010); George, 575 F.3d at 393; Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 709 (3d Cir. 2004); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341,
348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
This depends both on the kind of mark at issue, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
23.
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992), and the fame and uniqueness of the trademark in the
marketplace. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 479 (3d Cir.
1994) ("Distinctiveness on the scale of trademarks is one measure of a mark's strength....
Commercial strength, or marketplace recognition of the mark, is another."). For further
discussion of different types of marks, see note 17 supra.
24.
See Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 853, 869 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The
degree of similarity between marks turns upon sight, sound, and meaning.").
25.
In appropriate cases, the absence of any evidence of actual confusion may provide
grounds for concluding that no confusion is likely to occur. See Libman Co. v. Vining Indus.,
Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 (7th Cir. 1995).
Sophisticated consumers are supposed to detect more subtle differences between
26.
rival marks. See Centaur Commc'ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc'ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1228 (2d
Cir. 1987) ("Sophistication of consumers usually militates against a finding of a likelihood
of confusion . . . ."). Moreover, a consumer who is spending a large amount of money is more
likely to be alert to minor differences than a consumer who is spending a small amount of
money on an impulse purchase. See Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 975
(10th Cir. 2002).
27.
See George, 575 F.3d at 393.
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) ("In
28.
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source identifying mark,
'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' for it quickly
and easily assures a potential customer that this item-the item with this mark-is made
by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in
the past." (internal citation omitted) (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2:3).
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and brand identity will be returned in the form of purchases. 29
This too helps consumers, indirectly. If, because of trademark
confusion, consumers pleased with their purchases would be
uncertain whom to reward with future business, trademark
owners would have less incentive to produce goods of high
quality. 30
The Trademark Act, also known as the Lanham Act, provides
causes of action for the infringement of registered and
unregistered trademarks. 3 1 In either case, the owner's rights stem
from the use of the trademark in commerce to identify the source
of the owner's goods. 32 The rights continue as long as the use
continues. 33 If the owner stops using the mark, with no intent to
resume use in the foreseeable future, the mark may be
abandoned. 34 A mark that has been abandoned "returns to the
public domain," and may be freely adopted by others to identify
the source of their goods. 35
In most respects, "[r]ights in a trademark are determined by
the date of the mark's first use in commerce," and the party who
can claim first use has "priority over other users." 36 A mark may

be refused registration if it is the same or confusingly similar to a
mark already in use, 37 and a registration may be cancelled on the
same basis. 38 A defense available to a party accused of
infringement is that it was actually the first to use the mark in
commerce. 39 The priority of the first user has been called a
"cardinal principle" of trademark law. 4 0 Nevertheless, under
29.
See id. at 164 ("[The law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable
product.").
30.
See id. at 163-64.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2012). Registration serves as prima facie evidence of
31.
the validity of the mark and of the right of the registrant to its exclusive use. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1057(b), 1115(a); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1047 (9th Cir. 1999).
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2005).
32.
33.
Id. at 147.
34.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining "abandoned"); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40,
46-47 (2d Cir. 1989).
35.
George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400 (4th Cir. 2009).
36.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015); see also Quicksilver,
Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Trademark rights are acquired by
the party that first uses a mark in connection with the sale of goods."); Zasu Designs v.
L'Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (referring to the "race to the marketplace to
establish the exclusive right to a mark").
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
37.
15 U.S.C. § 1064.
38.
39.
See Haggar Int'l Corp. v. United Co. for Food Indus. Corp., 906 F. Supp. 2d 96,
130 (E.D.N.Y 2012) (discussing the "prior use defense"); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)-(6).
40.
One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009);
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limited circumstances, someone who first used a trademark
different than the one currently in use may invoke the principle of
tacking to claim the rights of a senior user.
As early as 1900, the Supreme Court endorsed the principle
that rights in a trademark may go beyond the precise form in
which it has been used and registered. In Saxlehner v. Eisner
Mendelson Co.,41 the plaintiff had registered the name "Hunyadi
Janos" for bottled water which, according to the defendant, waived
its rights to the term "Hunyadi" alone. 42 The court held that the
plaintiffs rights were not limited by the prior registration, and
also that infringement did not depend on the appropriation of
every word of the registered mark. 43 "It is sufficient," the court
said, "that enough be taken to deceive the public in the purchase
of a protected article." 44 Because the "principle word" of the mark
was "Hunyadi," others were not free to use that portion of the mark
under circumstances that would lead to confusion. 45
If a portion of a mark (like "Hunyadi" alone) may itself have
significance as an indicator of brand origin, then continued use of
that portion may justify uninterrupted trademark rights, even
where other aspects of the mark have changed. In Beech-Nut
Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 4 6 another case of the early 20th
century, the court found that Lorillard had not lost its status as
the senior user of the mark BEECHNUT for tobacco, even though
the graphic elements that accompanied the term on the product
label had been replaced. 47 Lorillard had altered the formula, and
that "justified a change in the decorative features of the
package."4 8 The court observed that packaging for tobacco in
general had "undergone many improvements," and that depriving
a trademark owner of the freedom to "redecorate or reornament,
or, to use a somewhat inelegant phrase, polish it up would
be ... unreasonable."4 9

see also Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir.
1999) (referring to the rights of the first user as a "fundamental tenet of trademark law");
Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int'l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) ("It is axiomatic
in trademark law that the standard test of ownership is priority of use.").
41.
Saxiehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900).
42.
Id. at 32.
43.
Id. at 32-33.
44.
Id. at 33.
45.
Id. at 32-33.
Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 299 F. 834 (D.N.J. 1924).
46.
47.
Id. at 851.
48.
Id. at 850.
49.
Id.
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B. DistinguishingTrademarks from Their Display
The Beech-Nut situation may be an easy case. If the graphics,
consisting of a squirrel and other design elements, were simply
decorative, then they may have had no trademark significance in
the first place.50 If they did have such significance-perhaps
customers recognized the squirrel as an indicator of the Lorillard
product rather than the tobacco of a competitor-one could still
regard the word "Beechnut" and the graphics as separate
trademarks, much like the word "Nike" and the "swoosh" symbol
that often accompanies it. Moreover, courts have often determined
that word marks-like BEECHNUT-have meaning that
transcends any particular manner in which they are shown.5 1
Accordingly, a trademark owner "may change the display of a
[word] mark at any time because whatever rights he may possess
in the mark reside in the term itself rather than in any particular
form or arrangement thereof." 52
A recent example can be found in Paris Glove of Canada,Ltd.
v. SBC/Sporto Corp.,53 where a "rectangular" version of the mark
AQUA STOP for rain boots (one word printed above the other) had
been replaced by a "semicircular" version (both words together and
arranged on a curve, as though hugging the upper portion of a
circle).54 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board observed that
"[m]arks entirely comprised of words can sometimes be varied as
to their style of lettering, size and other elements of form without
resulting in a material alteration of the mark."5 5 In this case, the

50.
See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7:24 ("[If a design is solely or merely
ornamental and does not also identify and distinguish source, then it cannot be given the
status of a valid trademark.").
51.
See Drexel Enters., Inc. v. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir. 1962)
(explaining that a change from slanted script to block letters was immaterial because "[a)
mere change in form of a mark is not itself an abandonment of the previous form or of a
trademark"); Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., No. 7:02CV00611, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *20 (W.D. Va. 2006) ("[A] word mark registration allows [the owner]
to change the font style of the registered words without losing trademark protection.");
Beech-Nut, 299 F. at 850 ("The trademark consisted in the word simply, and the plaintiffs
might have printed it on any form of label they might fancy, without losing the protection
of the law." (citation omitted)).
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sekisui Chem. Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597, 603
52.
(T.T.A.B. 1970); see also Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224
(C.C.P.A. 1976); Vacuum-Electric Corp. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 215, 216
(T.T.A.B. 1966).
Paris Glove of Can., Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856
53.
(T.T.A.B. 2007).
54.
Id. at 1859-60.
55.
Id. at 1861; see also Jack Wolfskin GmbH & Co. v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U.,
116 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1133-34 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discounting minor stylistic
alterations to a mark featuring the word "Kelme" and a paw print design).
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Board found that the change in form did not "change the essential
nature. of the ... mark." 5 6 The impression conveyed was
"dependent upon the literal terms AQUA STOP," rather than on
the rectangular or semicircular arrangement.5 7 Because the mark
had not been materially altered, the owner could properly claim
uninterrupted use.5 8

Courts have also held that altering the "display" of a word
mark by changes in background graphic elements does not
constitute a legally significant change. 59 In Jay-Zee, Inc. v.
Hartfield-Zodys, Inc.,60 the Board held that a change in the shape
of a border that originally surrounded the words THE IMAGE on
clothing labels-from an ellipse to a rectangle-was "wholly
immaterial." 6 1 These "common geometric shapes . .. merely
separate the word feature from the non-trademark information on
the

label." 62

The

Board

found that

"[s]uch

banal outlines

contribute little, if anything, to the origin-indicating utility of a
mark." 63 But here a word of caution is in order. Graphic or pictorial
elements accompanying words are sometimes "integral" to the
impression conveyed by mark as a whole. 64 In such cases,
alteration of the graphics may constitute a significant break.
In Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc.,65 the court
warned that "when dealing with a composite mark involving an
integrated design element, a change to that design element may
well alter the commercial impression."6 6 The composite mark in
Louangel consisted of the words LONG HORN STEAKS, in which
56.
Paris Glove, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1862.
Id.
57.
58.
See id. (granting summary judgment that the changes did not lead to the
abandonment of the original mark).
See Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assocs., Inc., 205 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D.N.J.
59.
1962) (referring to a "liberal policy" for accepting evidence of the continued use of a
trademark in cases where the "manner of display or background" differs from what was
shown in the registration) (citation omitted)).
60.
Jay-Zee, Inc. v. Hartfield-Zodys, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 269 (T.T.A.B. 1980).
61.
Id. at 271.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.; see also Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 724, 727 (C.C.P.A.
1968) (stating the likelihood of confusion between TORNADO and VORNADO marks was
unaffected by the practice of representing the former in advertising with a "whirling funnel"
design; because the display of a mark "may be changed at any time as may be dictated by
the fancy of the . . . owner," the owner's rights should not be limited by its form of
advertising).
64.
See Paris Glove of Can., Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856,
1862 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (finding no design feature of the rectangular form that was "integral"
to the AQUA STOP trademark).
Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809 (S.D. Tex.
65.
2013).
66.
Id. at 1814.
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the head of a cartoon-style baby-faced cow substituted for the "0"
in LONG, and a cartoon-style t-bone steak substituted for the "T"
in STEAKS.6 7 When the owner changed to a "minimalist" design,
with more restrained typography and a separate, stylized
depiction of a steer's head replacing the cartoon cow, this had the
effect of introducing an entirely new mark, even though the only
change in the words was the replacement of STEAKS with
STEAKHOUSE.68
Similarly, the Board denied the Optimist International
Society their claimed priority date for the use of the initials "01"
due to changes in the composite mark in which the initials had
been displayed.6 9 For decades, the Society had always shown the
initials within an octagon, accompanied by the words OPTIMIST
INTERNATIONAL and a sunburst design. 70 The Society had not
used the initials "01" alone until years after the Onlzed club of
Owens-Illinois had begun to do so. 71 As the Board put it, the
"collision occurred" when the Optimists removed the "OI" from the
"protective orbit" of the octagon and other design elements. 72 This
meant, "for all practical purposes, creat[ing] a new mark. . . ."73
A more subtle change occurred in Adventis, where the
registered mark BIG LOTS had been altered by the addition of an
exclamation point. 74 The court conceded that adding an
exclamation point as punctuation normally would not change a
word mark enough to affect the owner's seniority.75 Here, however,
the exclamation point had been added between the words BIG and
LOTS, and evidence suggested that the owner of the mark had
featured the exclamation point by itself in advertising and
signage. 76 The addition of the exclamation point as a graphic
device could have changed the impression conveyed by the words
alone.77

67.
See id. at 1811.
68.
See id. at 1811, 1815.
69.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Optimist Int'l, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 127 (T.T.A.B.
1972).
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 125.
73.
Id. at 127.
74.
Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., No. 7:02CV00611, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22436, at *20 (W.D. Va. 2006).
75.
Id. at *21.
76.
Id. at *22-23.
77.
Id. at *23 (denying summary judgment).
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C. Additions, Subtractions, and Substitutions
Many tacking cases involve word marks that have been
altered by additions, subtractions, or substitutions. Sometimes
these changes have deprived the trademark owner of the benefit
of its earlier version of the mark, and sometimes they have not.
1. Additions. In American Security Bank v. American
Security & Trust Co., the firm that had first used and registered
the mark AMERICAN SECURITY for banking services sought to
register AMERICAN SECURITY BANK as well.78 The
registration was opposed by another firm already using the term. 79
The applicant argued that "the addition of the purely descriptive
word 'Bank' is no change at all,"8 0 entitling the applicant to the
status of senior user of the mark. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) agreed: "While AMERICAN SECURITY BANK is
a distinguishable, three-word mark, the word 'bank' is purely
descriptive and adds nothing to the origin-indicating significance
of AMERICAN SECURITY."8 1 Customers who did business with
the applicant under the earlier name knew already that the
applicant was a bank. 82 The marks were legal equivalentS 83 and
the rights of the applicant were superior to those of the opposer
and junior user of the mark. 84
In American Security Bank, the word "Bank" seems to have
been, in a sense, an implicit component of the earlier version of the
mark, 85 so that making it explicit effected no change at all.86 The
addition in D&J Master Clean, Inc. v. Servicemaster Co., 87 seems

more significant. The ServiceMASTER firm (SMC) adopted the name
"ServiceMASTER Clean" to distinguish its cleaning services from the

78.
Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Sec. & Tr. Co., 571 F.2d 564, 564-66 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
79.
See id. at 565-66.
80.
Id. at 567.
81.
Id.
82.
See id. (During the seventy-three years when applicant had used the shortened
name, "[i]ts customers ... always knew that the institution going by the nickname of or
using the service mark AMERICAN SECURITY was a bank.").
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 568.
See ICON Sols., Inc. v. IKON Office Sols., Inc., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist.
85.
LEXIS 9101, at *21 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (remarking that in American Security Bank "the
additional term 'bank' had always been implicit").
86.
See also Colonial Elec. & Plumbing Supply of Hammonton, LLC v. Colonial Elec.
Supply, Ltd., No. 05-5408, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94417, at *30-31 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 2007)
(explaining that COLONIAL ELECTRIC SUPPLY is the legal equivalent of COLONIAL
ELECTRIC because the names had been used synonymously and either business would
"supply" electrical goods).
87.
D&J Master Clean, Inc. v. Servicemaster Co., 181 F. Supp. 2d 821 (S.D. Oh. 2002).
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other services it offered, such as lawn care, food management, and
home health care.88 In a dispute involving potential confusion with
another firm's "Master Clean" mark for cleaning services,
ServiceMaster claimed to be the senior user by virtue of its prior use
of "ServiceMASTER" alone. 89 The court allowed SMC the benefit of
tacking, finding that the word "Clean" was "purely descriptive" and
an addition that "add[ed] nothing of significance to the original
mark." 90 The "ServiceMASTER" mark was "long-established,
federally registered, and widely recognized. .. ."91 The business now
designated as "ServiceMASTER Clean" was, as a franchisee put it,
92
"'just . .. a branch of ServiceMASTER' that "'happen[s] to clean."'
The court deemed SMC's decision "to modify slightly its mark" one
93
that was "reasonable and lawful."

The addition of "Clean" told consumers something about the
business that "ServiceMASTER" alone did not and, as intended, it
differentiated the cleaning services from others provided by the same
firm. On other occasions, courts have held that words adding
comparable information were a significant change that barred the
application of tacking. In American Paging, Inc. v. American
Mobilphone, Inc.,94 a firm using the mark AMERICAN PAGING
sought cancellation of a registration for AMERICAN MOBILPHONE
PAGING by a firm that had first used AMERICAN MOBILPHONE
alone. 95 Although the registrant argued that PAGING was merely
descriptive of the services it offered, 96 the court denied it the benefit
of tacking. Calling it a "close question,"97 the court relied on the
registrant's provision of two types of service-mobile phone services
and radio paging services. In contrast to American Security Bank,

Id. at 823-24.
88.
89.
See id. at 825.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. In Neely v. Boland Mfg. Co., 274 F.2d 195, 202 (8th Cir. 1960), the court found
93.
insignificant the addition "by Neely" to the mark "Jiffy" for garment bags, regarding the
terms "Jiffy" and "Jiffy by Neely" as being "in legal effect, identical." However, the court
seemed to base its conclusion on the likelihood of confusion between garment bags bearing
a "Jiffy" or "Jiffy by Neely" mark. See id. ("Surely, anyone using the word 'Jiffy' on garment
bags would infringe the trade-mark 'Jiffy by Neely', and the use of the latter mark on such
bags would infringe the trade-mark 'Jiffy'."). In the tacking context, courts have often held
that likelihood of confusion is not the proper standard by which to judge if marks are legally
equivalent. See Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2013), aff'd
135 S. Ct. 907 (2015).
Am. Paging, Inc. v. Am. Mobilphone, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2036 (T.T.A.B.
94.
1989).
Id. at 2036-37.
95.
Id. at 2037.
96.
Id. at 2038.
97.
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customers of the mobile phone services "would not know they were
dealing with a company that also rendered paging services." 98 The
two services were distinct enough to be separately listed in the yellow
pages, using the different variants of the registrant's marks. 99
Because it "convey[ed] more information to potential customers,"1 00
the AMERICAN MOBILPHONE PAGING mark was a separate
mark, entitled only to its own date of first use. 0 1
Other cases support the rule that additions providing further
information to consumers will deny a trademark owner the benefit
of tacking. In Fifth Ave. of Long Island Realty Assocs. v. Caruso
Mgmt. Co.,1 02 two shopping centers, one in Manhasset, New York
and the other in Glendale, California, used the word AMERICANA
in their names.103 The New York firm, now using the name
AMERICANA MANHASSET, claimed priority through its earlier
use and registration of AMERICANA alone.1 0 4 The California firm
argued that AMERICANA had been abandoned through
non-use.105 The court found the change a significant one; the
addition of MANHASSET "convey[ed] a specific location," while
AMERICANA alone "convey[ed] only an image of things culturally
related to America." 0 6 In The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Management,
Inc., 0 7 the Board held that priority in the mark ARDENBEAUTY
could not be based on Elizabeth Arden's earlier use of the mark
ARDEN alone.108 Although the word "beauty" is often used in the
field of cosmetics, the word ARDEN by itself "generally refers to
any person with that surname," whereas "ARDENBEAUTY
imparts additional information about that person [as] one
possessing certain qualities or characteristics."1 09

98.
Id. at 2039.
99.
Id. at 2038.
100.
Id. at 2039.
101.
Id.
102.
Fifth Ave. of Long Island Realty Assocs. v. Caruso Mgmt. Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d
292 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
103.
Id. at 297.
104.
See id. at 301-02.
105.
See id. at 306.
106.
Id. at 310. The court also noted that the additional word made the marks "aurally
and visually dissimilar," and that the two marks were displayed in different styles. Id. at
309.
107.
The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
108.
Id. at 1637.
109.
Id. Although the opinions do not discuss added information explicitly, one might
put in this same category Advance Stores Co. v. Refinishing Specialties, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
643, 653 (W.D. Ken. 1996) (holding that ADVANCE AUTO PARTS could not tack on their
earlier use of ADVANCE alone) and Super Value Stores, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1539, 1541-42 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (denying Exxon priority in TIGER MART for retail
convenience stores based on its earlier use of TIGER alone for petroleum products). While
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2. Subtractions. Other cases consider the opposite
question-whether a firm that removes words from its trademark
sacrifices its ability to claim the priority date of the original
version. In Fifth Avenue, the court concluded, after a review of
precedent, that tacking is more likely to be permitted where words
have been subtracted, rather than added or changed. 110 Two
examples of inconsequential subtraction come from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. In Forum Corp. v. Forum, Ltd., the
plaintiff gradually changed its mark from THE FORUM
CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA to THE FORUM
CORPORATION, or just THE FORUM.'1 1 The abbreviation, the
court found, made little difference. It was the defendant's
responsibility to avoid confusion with an existing mark, and
because "the salient and memorable feature" of plaintiffs name
remained intact, the changes did not free the defendant of that
responsibility.11 2 In Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
plaintiff STW owned a registration for THIRST-AID "FIRST AID
FOR YOUR THIRST."11 3 Quaker, which used "Thirst Aid" in its
advertising for Gatorade, argued that STW's rights were
abandoned when it dropped the "FIRST AID FOR YOUR THIRST"
portion of the slogan.11 4 The court disagreed, finding that the "key
5
element" of the mark-the words THIRST-AID-had endured."1
A less plausible circumstance for tacking was presented in
6
National Bakers Services, Inc. v. Hain Pure Food Co., Inc.11 The
case involved an application for the mark HOLLYWOOD for
mayonnaise, which was opposed by a firm using the same mark
the issue arose in an unusual context, one could add to the list O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In O-M Bread, the Federal Circuit
determined that the prior use of OLYMPIC for baked goods did not allow the applicant to
register OLYMPIC KIDS. Because of special legislation concerning the Olympic Games,
use of "Olympic" had to depend on grandfathered rights. The applicant was permitted to
use OLYMPIC alone, but the addition of KIDS created a separate mark, even though "kids"
was merely descriptive of the target market. Id. at 936-38.
See Caruso Mgmt. Co., 718 F. Supp. at 309 ("Upon analysis of the cases, the court
110.
notes that there is a difference between the deletion of words from a registered mark, and
adding to, or changing words of that mark. While it may be easier to find a continuing
commercial impression where words are deleted, courts are less likely to conclude that two
marks convey the same impression when words are changed or added.").
Forum Corp. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 1990).
111.
Id.
112.
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 1992).
113.
See id.
114.
Id.; see also Puritan Sportswear Corp. v. Shure, 307 F. Supp. 377, 389 (W.D. Penn.
115.
1969) (explaining that elimination of every word but PURITAN from the registered mark
PURITAN SPORTSWEAR, THE CHOICE OF ALL AMERICANS did not mean
abandonment).
Nat'l Bakers Servs., Inc. v. Hain Pure Food Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 701 (T.T.A.B.
116.
1980).
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for bread. The applicant relied, in part, on its ownership of the
previously registered mark HOLLYWOOD HEALTH FOODS. 117
The court found that the additional term "health foods" was
"highly descriptive and generic" and "merely designate[d] a
general type of food.""i8 Its omission did not change the "dominant
portion" of the mark.11 9 Purchasers "would perceive both marks as
'HOLLYWOOD' and would not be deterred from this perception by
the descriptive words 'health foods."'1 20 In this case the conclusion
seems dubious. Particularly in the context of mayonnaise (not
generally perceived as a health food), the additional words might
have conveyed a very different impression.
Instead of looking for the key element, salient feature, or
dominant portion of the original form, in some cases one could
treat the original as more than one mark, where discontinued use
of one mark would not affect ongoing rights in the other. In Proxite
Prods., Inc. v. Bonnie Brite Prods. Corp., the plaintiff, after using
the mark BONNIE BLUE for laundry bluing, had used and
registered the mark PROX BONNIE BLUE.1 21 Eventually it
dropped PROX, returning to BONNIE BLUE alone.1 22 PROX had
been added following a corporate merger, "and perhaps to identify
the origin of the bluing with the previous corporation."1 23 The court
found that dropping PROX later did not abandon plaintiffs rights
in the registered mark, and that, even if it had, plaintiff might
claim common law rights in BONNIE alone due to its continuous
use of that term to identify its product.1 24 More recently, in Jimlar
Corp. v. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Board
found tacking appropriate even though the mark A CLUB for
footwear had originally been coupled with BY AMERICAN
EAGLE in a composite mark.1 25 The Board found that on the
original label A CLUB had been "so conspicuously used as to create
a separate and distinct commercial impression;" hence the words
A CLUB alone had "separately functioned as a mark."1 26
117.
Id. at 703.
118.
Id. at 707.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Proxite Prods., Inc. v. Bonnie Brite Prods. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
122.
Id. at 513.
123.
Id. at 514.
Id.
124.
125.
Jimlar Corp. v. The Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216,
1221 (T.T.A.B. 1992).
126.
Id. The Board noted that A CLUB had always been displayed with the same
distinctive style, with the word CLUB superimposed over a capital letter "A." Id. In Family
Circle, Inc. v. Family CircleAssociates, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 940, 943 (D.N.J. 1962), the court
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In other cases, courts have found that omitting terms
previously used had the effect of creating an entirely new mark.
The easiest cases may be those where the omission led to a
different meaning. In Viviane Woodward Corp. v. Roberts,12 7 a
cologne manufacturer sought to register the mark EGO, relying on
its prior use of ALTER EGO.1 2 8 The Board held that the two marks
were not legal equivalents. 2 9 Similarly, in Corporate Fitness
Programs, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, Inc.,130 the applicant
claimed rights in the mark SHAPE for a fitness magazine, relying
on prior use of SHAPE-UP.131 The Board held that SHAPE and
SHAPE-UP are "obviously different designations which have
commercial
different
create
and
meanings
different
13 2
The Board pointed to dictionary definitions
impressions."
defining the former as a geometric form and the latter as a process
of improvement.1 33
In other cases of omission, attempts to tack on the use of a
previous mark have come up against a reluctance to permit the
impermissible "broadening" of trademark rights.1 34 Potential
broadening is easiest to perceive in cases where a trademark
owner claims rights to, in effect, a "family" of trademarks linked

referred to expert testimony that "it is a normal event for two marks to be combined into
one composite mark." If the parts of a composite form a "unitary meaning" (e.g., YANKEE
CLIPPER), then use of those parts together would not demonstrate the use of any of them
separately. Id. In Family Circle, however, the name FAMILY CIRCLE had appeared much
more prominently than the word EVERYWOMAN'S that had at one point preceded it in a
composite mark. Id. at 944. Hence, use of the composite did amount to use of FAMILY
CIRCLE itself as a trademark. Id. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Quicksilver found that
the use of QUICKSILVER ROXY may have been insufficient to establish rights in ROXY
alone. Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 763 (9th Cir. 2006). The court
observed that "[a] product mark like "ROXY," even if always displayed with a house mark
like "QUIKSILVER," may acquire independent trademark significance." Id. at 757. But
here the ROXY name may not have acquired that significance. Id. at 758. In fact, ROXY
had always been displayed with the "house mark" QUICKSILVER due to concerns that
otherwise "'no one would have known what "Roxy" was."' Id. at 759.
Viviane Woodward Corp. v. Roberts, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840 (T.T.A.B. 1974).
127.
Id. at 841.
128.
129.
Id.
Corp. Fitness Programs, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
130.
1682 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
Id. at 1683.
131.
Id. at 1687.
132.
See id. In Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555,
133.
562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the defendant could not tack prior use of the mark MARCO POLO
for clothing to its current use of POLO alone. This is another instance where the omission
of a single word creates a mark with an entirely different connotation. Id.
See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th
134.
Cir. 1999); Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1991), abrogatedby Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907 (2015).
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by a single element used before in one or more composite marks. 135
In Feed FlavorsInc. v. Kemin Indus., Inc.,136 Kemin claimed prior
rights to the mark AROME applied to animal feed additives, based

on its sales of BAN AROME C, COVER-AROME, and PINE
AROME.' 3 7 In the Board's view, none of these were "substantially
the same as AROME, per se;" in each instance, "the addition of a
distinctive prefix... render[ed] these marks not only totally
different from each other but also from the registered mark
'AROME."'"3 8 Similarly, in John Morrell & Co. v. Hauser Packing
Co.,1 39 the plaintiff had used the word PRIDE in its trademarks for
cured meats, but only in combination with other words-e.g.,

MORRELL'S

PRIDE,

MORRELL'S

IOWA

PRIDE,

and

MORRELL'S DAKOTA PRIDE.1 40 Now it accused the defendant of
trademark infringement through its use of HAUSER'S PRIDE for
bacon and ham.141 Because PRIDE had not been registered as a
trademark, and the words with which it had been used were
equally prominent, the court found that Morrell had no rights in
PRIDE alone.1 42 In either of these cases, ignoring portions of the
marks actually used could well have "broadened" the owner's
rights beyond what could be justified.
Yet the strongest language against broadening appears in
Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp.,143 a case presenting
facts reminiscent of those in Sands, Taylor & Wood. Here the
Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board that a clothing
business using the trademark CLOTHES THAT WORK could not
secure priority via the previously-used mark CLOTHES THAT
WORK. FOR THE WORK YOU DO.144 The court observed that
"[s]imply because a mark is a portion of an earlier mark, [the]
analysis should not stop there."1 45 Rather, the tacking inquiry
"must focus on both marks in their entirety to determine whether

135.
See McDonald's Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1133
(N.D.N.Y. 1993) (observing that "numerous courts have held that [McDonald's] possesses a
family of marks using the "Mc" formative entitled to trademark protection").
136.
Feed Flavors Inc. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 360 (T.T.A.B. 1982).
137.
Id. at 362-63.
138.
Id. at 363.
139.
John Morrell & Co. v. Hauser Packing Co., 20 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1927).
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 714.
143. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
abrogated by Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907 (2015).
144.
Id. at 1160. In this case, rights to the earlier mark were purchased from another
firm, apparently for the express purpose of securing senior-user status for the later mark.
See id. at 1158.
145.
Id. at 1160.
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each conveys the same commercial impression." 1 4 6 Comparing the
marks themselves, the court could not disagree with the Board's
conclusion that the marks conveyed different commercial
impressions.14 7
The court also warned that "it would be clearly contrary to
well-established principles of trademark law to sanction the
tacking of a mark with a narrow commercial impression onto one
with a broader commercial impression." 148 The reference to "a
broader commercial impression" is cryptic. Although the earlier
mark included something (additional words) that the later mark
did not, the court does not explain how a commercial impression
can be either "broad" or "narrow." The court cites three cases in
support of its assertion-Corporate Fitness, Viviane Woodward,
and Polo Fashions-butthese are each cases where an omission
changed the meaning of the mark (from "shape up" to "shape,"
from "alter ego" to "ego," and from "Marco Polo" to "polo,"
respectively) without making the mark, in any obvious sense,
broader.149 Nevertheless, the court's admonition that broadening
is contrary to "well-established principles of trademark law" has
been repeated by other courts, 15 0 and it seems to apply most clearly
in instances of subtraction.
The proposition that marks must be compared "in their
entirety" for purposes of tacking could also be deemed a
well-established principle.15 1 If tacking depends on a continuous
commercial impression, then it can be judged only by comparing
the marks as a whole.1 52 Hence, one cannot, as the Federal Circuit
said, rely simply on the continued use of a portion of the earlier
mark. However, it is worth remembering in this context the

146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 1159-60.
148.
Id. at 1160.
149.
Id. (citing Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555,
562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Corp. Fitness Programs Inc. v. Weider Health and Fitness Inc., 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1685 (P.T.A.B. 1987); Viviane Woodard Corp. v. Roberts, 181
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840, 840 (P.T.A.B. 1974)).
150.
See, e.g., Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 760 (9th Cir. 2006);
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999);
Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074, 1079 (N.D.
Ill. 1998).
151.
See O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("No part of the mark can be ignored in comparing the marks as a whole."); KeyCorp. v. Key
Bank & Tr., 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Oh. 2000) ("[C]ourts may not split marks into
their component parts in determining whether they may be tacked, but rather must
evaluate the impression which the mark as a whole creates.").
152.
See Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm'r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 545-46
(1920) ("The commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived from it as a whole, not from
its elements separated and considered in detail.").
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Supreme Court's observation in Saxlehner that the public may be
deceived by appropriation of something less than the whole: "if a
thing contained twenty-five parts, and only one was taken, such
imitation would be sufficient to contribute to a deception, and the
law would hold those responsible who had contributed to the
fraud." 153 If that is the case, then a portion of the whole may have
significance as an indicator of source, and the continuous use of
that portion may justify some continuity of rights.
3. Substitutions. Courts seem most reluctant to permit
tacking in instances where the trademark owner seeks to
overcome changes to the mark, rather than additions or
subtractions. Success has generally been achieved only in cases
where the substitutions were exceedingly minor. In Hess's of
Allentown, Inc. v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 54 the plaintiff
claimed senior rights in the term HESS'S as applied to its
department store, by virtue of its prior use of HESS. 155 The court
found that "no distinction for legal or practical purposes can be
made between a name and the possessive form thereof, and the
record indicates that petitioner adopted the term HESS'S to reflect
the manner in which the purchasing public had come to refer to
and identify its store and operations." 15 6 Because the public would
regard HESS and HESS'S as "one and the same designation," 5 7
tacking was permitted.15 8 In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Sekisui
Chemical Co.,1 5 9 the Board recognized Sekisui's rights as the
senior user, even though it had modified its trademark S-LON to
the phonetic equivalent ESLON. 160 The marks "differ[ed]
essentially only by one letter and a hyphen;" they "convey[ed]
exactly the same significance" and would have been "recognized as
the same mark." 161 In In re Dial-A-Mattress OperatingCorp.,1 6 2 the

Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19, 33 (1900).
153.
154.
Hess's of Allentown, Inc. v. Nat'1 Bellas Hess, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673
(T.T.A.B. 1971).
Id. at 677.
155.
156.
Id.
Id.; see also Miami Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 276 F.2d 565, 568
157.
(5th Cir. 1960) ("'Miami Credit Bureau' and 'Credit Bureau of Greater Miami,' if not the
grammatical equivalent of each other, are so obviously synonymous as to be self-refutation
of the contention that the appellee abandoned the former trade name when it began to use
the latter.. . .").
Hess's, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 677.
158.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sekisui Chem. Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597 (T.T.A.B.
159.
1970).
Id. at 604.
160.
161.
Id.
162.
In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Federal Circuit found the mark 1-888-1IATRESS to be the legal
equivalent of the previously-registered mark 1-212-1VATTRES, in
spite of the misspelling in the latter and the different area code. 163
A more significant substitution did not stand in the way of
tacking in Hana Financial. A firm known as HANA BANK in
Korea advertised services in the United States as HANA
OVERSEAS KOREAN CLUB. 164 Later it used the name HANA
WORLD CENTER.165 Ultimately it adopted the name HANA
BANK, but by that time another firm was using the name HANA
FINANCIAL in the United States for similar services. 166 The user
of HANA BANK claimed the rights of the senior user via tacking,
and it received a favorable verdict after a jury trial.167 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed,1 68 because reasonable minds could conclude that
the marks HANA OVERSEAS KOREAN CLUB, HANA WORLD
CENTER, and HANA BANK were not "materially different."1 69
The court noted that in advertising HANA BANK had appeared in
Korean next to the original name, as had the firm's "distinctive
dancing man logo," and that "ordinary purchasers of the Bank's
services were likely aware of the Bank and its services from their
experiences in Korea."1 70 Under these circumstances, the names
could have conveyed a "continuous commercial impression of the
services the Bank offered and their origin."171
Very few cases permit tacking where the substitution is as
significant as it was in Hana Financial. One example is John
Winkler's Sons, Inc. v. American Express Co.,1 7 2 where a delivery
company using the mark CAREFREE CRUISE was permitted to
tack on its prior use of THE CAREFREE PLAN in order to achieve
priority over American Express's CAREFREE mark for travel
163.
Id. at 1348. Here the context was whether the trademark owner could rely on
registration of the earlier version of the mark to establish the acquired distinctiveness of
the later version. In Children's Legal Services PLLC v. Kresch, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1766 (E.D. Mich. 2008), the court allowed tacking where it found the substitution of
1-800-MYCHILD for 1-888-4MYCHILD to be "only a trivial alteration that would not have
disrupted the overall commercial impression that observers gleaned from the mark." In
Viking Boat Co., Inc. v. Viking Camper Supply, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 302 (T.T.A.B.
1976), the Board overlooked the omission of a hyphen, changing VI-KING to VIKING.
164.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015).
165.
Id.
166.
Id. at 909-10.
167.
Id. at 910.
168.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2013), aff'd 135 S. Ct. 907
(2015).
169.
Id. at 1166.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 1166-67.
172.
John Winkler's Sons, Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 442 (T.T.A.B.
1972).
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tours. 1 7 3 The Board relied on "a natural transition in the use of the

term CAREFREE which did not change the essential nature of this
mark or term." 174 Perhaps the most liberal example can be found in
Laura Scudder's v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. 175 Here the change

from BLUE BIRD for fresh vegetables to BLUE ROBIN (each with
an accompanying bird design) did not deprive the applicant of its
rights as senior user.1 76 Even though "blue bird" describes a number
of common bird species and "blue robin" (at least on this continent)
does not, 177 the Board found the substitution "of no particular
consequence insofar as applicant's rights ... are concerned." 178 The
two marks "creat[ed] substantially the same general impression,
namely, that of a blue-colored bird."1 79
Far more common are cases where minor substitutions denied
the trademark owner the benefits of tacking. In Data Concepts,
Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc.,1s0 the Sixth Circuit held that the
stylized lower-case letters "dci" used as a trademark by Data
Concepts looked too dissimilar to the upper-case "DCI" later used
in Data Concept's internet address.' 8 ' In.Pro-Cuts v. Schilz-Price
Enterprises, Inc.,1 82 the Board found that the substitution of
PRO-CUTS in stylized lettering for PRO-KUT, with different
stylized lettering and a palm tree design, was enough to alter the
commercial impression of the mark, even though the two versions
were confusingly similar.183 In Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon,
Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc.,1 84 the owner of the mark LONE*
STEAKHOUSE AND SALOON could not claim seniority over
LONE* STEAKS by tacking on its prior use of LONE* CAFE. 185
In KeyCorp. v. Key Bank & Trust, 8 6 the defendant changed its
Id. at 444.
173.
Id.
174.
Laura Scudder's v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (T.T.A.B.
175.
1962).
Id. at 419.
176.
David Michael Bird's The Bird Almanac: The Ultimate Guide to Essential Facts
177.
and Figures of the World's Birds includes listings for an Indian Blue Robin and Siberian
Blue Robin. DAVID MICHAEL BIRD, THE BIRD ALMANAC: THE ULTIMATE GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL
FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE WORLD'S BIRDS 144 (1999).

178.
Laura Scudder's,136 U.S.P.Q. at 419.
179.
Id.
Data Concepts, Inc. v. Dig. Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998).
180.
Id. at 623-24.
181.
Pro-Cuts v. Schilz-Price Enters., Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
182.
Id. at 1227.
183.
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355 (11th
184.
Cir. 1997), modified by Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122
F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 1997).
185.
Id. at 362.
KeyCorp. v. Key Bank & Tr., 99 F. Supp. 2d. 814 (N.D. Oh. 2000).
186.
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mark from KEY FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN to KEY FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK, then KEY BANK & TRUST. 1 8 7 The first change
had been so that the defendant could distance itself from
Maryland's savings and loan crisis, and the second because the
institution had converted to a state-chartered bank.1 88 The court
found that the marks did not convey, and were not meant to
convey, the same commercial impression.189
Courts have often denied tacking where substitutions altered
the literal meaning of the mark, as opposed to its meaning as a
signifier of brand origin. For example, in Ilco Corp. v. Ideal
Security Hardware Corp., 190 the change from HOME
PROTECTION HARDWARE to HOME PROTECTION CENTER,
each referring to a store display of various locks and latches, was
enough to alter the mark's commercial impression and deny the
user priority. 191 The latter term "signifie[d] a unitary aggregation
of goods related to home protection, the one place in the hardware
store to go for home protection needs." 1 92 The former term

"refer[red] to the hardware itself and not to its collection in one
place on the display rack." 193 In Compania Insular Tabacalera,
S.A. v. Camacho Cigars, Inc., the mark DON MARCO for cigars
and the previously registered mark SAN MARCOS were too
different to permit tacking, in part because "San" connotes a saint
and "Don" a Spanish gentleman.194 In Salem Commodities, Inc. v.
Miami Margarine Co., the court held that the change from NUT
MAID to NU-MAID for margarine and other products, although
involving only "one letter and a hyphen," had made "the
significance . . . entirely different"-the first version "indicating a
nut product" and the second "a product which is either new or
freshly made."1 95

187.
Id. at 816.
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 820. The court deemed "KBT's claim that its name changes were not
noticeable to customers .. .somewhat disingenuous given that at least its first name change
was made in the hope that its customers would distinguish its former name from its new
one." Id.
190.
Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
191.
Id. at 1224-25.
192.
Id. at 1224.
193.
Id. at 1225; see also ICON Sols. v. IKON Office Sols., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9101, at *22 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1998) (finding that IKON and IKON OFFICE
SOLUTIONS have "very different connotation[s] ... the former suggest[ing] a high-tech
company ... [and] the latter .. . a whole range of office-related technical products and
services.").

194.
Compania Insular Tabacalera, S.A. v. Camacho Cigars, Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
299, 304 (T.T.A.B. 1970).
195.
Salem Commodities, Inc. v. Miami Margarine Co., 244 F.2d 729, 731 (C.C.P.A.
1957).
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In Specht v. Google Inc., the plaintiff could not tack on to
196
ANDROID'S DUNGEON its earlier use of ANDROID DATA.
The Court rejected comparisons to Sands, Taylor & Wood, where
the trademark owner had retained the "dominant" portion of the
mark (THIRST-AID), while dropping the slogan that had
accompanied it.197 Here the plaintiff had made the "dominant
portion" ANDROID possessive, and it had replaced DATA with
DUNGEON. 198 DATA suggests "information" and DUNGEON a "a
dark usu[ally] underground prison or vault;" hence, the
substitution changed a mark associated with computer services to
one "with allusions to robotic prisons, futuristic vaults, or a
number of other meanings about which the Court will not
speculate." 199 If the.plaintiff had switched to using ANDROID
alone, or if it had replaced DATA with "a word or phrase with a
similar meaning or impression," then comparisons to Sands,
20 0
Taylor & Wood might have been justified.
Even a change in emphasis may be enough to forbid tacking.
In General Mills, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., General Mills changed its
trademark for an onion-flavored snack from UNYUMS to
ONYUMS." 20 1 Although the marks are phonetic equivalents (like
S-LON and ESLON), the Board found that "the emphasis and
connotation of 'UNYUMS' is dictated by the 'YUMS' or 'yummy'
portion with the emphasis in 'ONYUMS' being with the term
'onions."'

202

Along with the visual disparities in the two words, the

difference in emphasis was enough to deny General Mills its
203
claimed date of first use.

D. Altered Designs
Tacking cases occasionally involve marks that are entirely or
predominantly visual in nature. The results in such cases are
mixed. The most liberal example of visual continuity may be found
in Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada. The Royal Bank
introduced an advertising campaign featuring a lion in a variety
204
of incongruous settings, including a wheat field and an oil rig.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
1972).
202.
203.
204.
1981).

Specht v. Google Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
See id. at 584.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 585.
General Mills, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148, 150 (T.T.A.B.
Id. at 152-53.
Id.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (S.D.N.Y.
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Previously, Dreyfus had adopted a realistic lion as its symbol, and
had run a celebrated series of television advertisements similar to
those of the Royal Bank, including one featuring a lion on Wall
Street. 205 More recently, Dreyfus had employed a stylized drawing
of a lion, in part because a realistic lion could not be reproduced
effectively in the newspaper advertisements on which Dreyfus now
relied. 206 Although Dreyfus had discontinued its television
advertisements, it "continued to use lions consistently with
continued recognition and strength." 207 Even the stylized lion in
the print advertisements was closely based on the realistic lion
seen in the television campaign, and the resemblance "may well
[have] suffice[d] to remind readers, even subliminally, of the
association with Dreyfus." 208 The changes happened "only because
investment patterns have changed, mandating changes in the type
and scale of advertising." 209 Citing Ilco, the court observed that
mere changes in the "form" of a mark do not deny the owner the
benefit of its earlier use. 210
Other cases have dealt with more specific visual designs. In
In re Flex-O-Glass, Inc., the applicant sought to register a mark
featuring a yellow rectangle inside a red circle. 211 The Board held
that the applicant could establish its distinctiveness by "tack[ing]
on" its previous use of a similar mark, even though in the prior
mark a portion of the rectangle was not colored yellow. 212 The
difference did not "distinguish them in any material way" or "mask
the prominence in each of the yellow rectangle and red circle." 2 1 3
Someone familiar with the earlier version would likely have
accepted the later "as the same mark or as an inconsequential
modification or modernization thereof." 2 14 In Fotormat Corp. v.
Cochran, the court disregarded minor changes in the design of the
Fotomat building-a design consistently promoted as a symbol of

205.
Id. at 1111-13.
206.
Id. at 1113.
207.
Id. at 1115.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id. It is difficult to determine precisely what the court held with respect to
Dreyfus's status as the senior user. This is because Dreyfus never completely discontinued
the use of realistic lions, and because Dreyfus's current form of advertising, which seems to
have begun before the disputed Royal Bank campaign, may have been close enough itself
to threaten confusion. See id. at 1117. The court seemed generally persuaded by Dreyfus's
"heavy dose of lion imagery." Id.
In re Flex-O-Glass Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 204 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
211.
212.
Id. at 205.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
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the busineSS 215-that did not alter its distinctive characteristics. 2 1 6
In Reynolds Consumer Products, Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp.,
Reynolds sufficiently demonstrated its ongoing use of a distinctive
packaging design for Reynolds Wrap aluminum foil, incorporating
a "familiar blue, silver, and pink color-pattern," in spite of minor
changes such as the introduction of curved silver lines separating
the blue and pink areas. 2 17 In Veryfine Products, Inc. v. Colon
Bros., Inc., the court discounted "trivial" changes in packaging
design for a beverage, including "a slightly different position of the
pineapple behind the orange in the pineapple orange design, and
minor color changes in part of an orange section and pineapple
rind." 2 18 The differences would be "apparent only upon a
painstakingly careful comparison of the forms of the marks."2 19
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in One Industries, LLC v. Jim
O'Neal Distributing, Inc., found that changes to a stylized "0"
design on motocross apparel disrupted the commercial impression
sufficiently to prevent tacking. 220 O'Neal had replaced a "thicker,
boxier 0' mark with rounded corners" with "an angular
approach." 221 Although the Ninth Circuit called it a "close case," it
agreed with the district court that, as a matter of law, the change
from the "[rlounded" mark to the "[a]ngular" mark denied O'Neal
the status of senior user of the latter mark. 2 2 2 Each mark consisted
of an "0" and an apostrophe, but in the first version the apostrophe
was separated from the "0," and in the second the apostrophe
(which now resembled a triangle) was connected. 223 In addition,
some lines on the later mark were thicker, and the "0"looked more
like a lemon. 2 2 4 These differences established that the marks were
not "indistinguishable." 225
215.
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Kan. 1977).
216.
Id. at 1245. The change occurred "when the word 'FOTOMAT' was moved from
the ends to the sides of the kiosks, and the size of the letters was increased from about 7
inches to about 11 inches." Id. at 1236.
217.
Reynolds Consumer Prods. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 13-cv-214, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26932, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2014). If the designs did not create "a continuing
commercial impression," the court could not "imagine any two non-identical marks that
would." Id. at * 11.
218.
Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 255 (D.P.R. 1992).
219.
Id.
One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009).
220.
221.
Id. at 1156-57.
222.
Id. at 1161, 1166.
223.
Id. at 1161.
224.
Id.
225.
Id. (citation omitted); c.f., Miyano Mach. USA, Inc. v. Mianohitec Mach., Inc., 576
F. Supp. 2d 868, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that adoption of a "stylized 'winged M' logo"
did not mean abandonment of a "block 'winged M' logo," because the transition involved
only "a small stylistic change in font").
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E. Product Changes
The discussion so far has centered on cases where a
trademark changed, but the products associated with the mark did
not. Sometimes changes to the trademark and the product go hand
in hand. When that occurs, changes to the product may be a
consideration in determining whether the trademark owner has
lost its rights as the senior user.
Courts have long held that minor changes to a product, such as
a change in formula, do not affect the rights of a trademark owner.
In Royal Milling Co. v. J.F. Imbs Milling Co., the court held that
the rights of the senior user to the trademark "REX" for flour were
uninterrupted, even though the source of the flour had changed
from soft wheat to hard winter wheat.226 The mark continued to be
used on "good flour," of the same grade as before. 227 The change was
no more material than a change in the process for making the flour
would have been. 228 As expressed in another case of similar vintage:
[T]he modern concept of a trade-mark is not so rigid as to
forbid slight variations necessitated by trade discoveries,
newer and more economical methods of making the same
product, or changed manufacturing conditions, even in a
secret formula to which the trade-mark is appurtenant. A
consideration of the continual changes, advertised and not
advertised, which are made in familiar trade-marked
products, clearly indicates that any other principle would
hinder rather than protect manufacturing proprietors of
trade-marked goods and make exceedingly tenuous the
protection which the law affords the mark symbolizing an
established and/or potential good will. 2 2 9

In Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., the court
acknowledged Lorillard's right to modify its tobacco blend without

&

226.
Royal Milling Co. v. J.F. Imbs Milling Co., 44 App. D.C. 207, 208-09 (C.A.D.C.
1915).
227.
Id. at 208.
228.
Id.; see Fast Chem. Prods. Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 562
(T.T.A.B. 1962) ("[The mere fact that the formulae or primary use of the product may have
been changed through the years does not constitute an abandonment of the mark.").
229.
Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd Muehlens, Inc. 38 F.2d 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1929);
rev'd in part, 43 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding that the mark implied that the cologne
was still made by the original formula, when it was not); see Marlyn Neutraceuticals, Inc.
v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Trademark owners are
permitted to make small changes to their products without abandoning their marks. . . .");
see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. G.C. Murphy Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 807, 813
(T.T.A.B. 1978) (change from a premium paint to a budget-priced paint sold under the name
EASY CARE would not affect the trademark owner's rights); E.I. du Pont de Nemours
Co. v. Big Bear Stores, Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 50, 51-52 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (holding that a
change in type of finish marketed under the name "SUPER SHIELD" would not mean
abandonment of the trademark).
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sacrificing its trademark. 230 Lorillard could "revive" the moribund
Beechnut brand by "improv[ing] the tobacco in any way which
would make it marketable." 23 1 The change in formula, in turn,
"justified a change in the decorative features of the package which
was to contain this new blend or mixture." 23 2 Hence the changes in
the blend and the label together did not deprive Lorillard of its
status as the senior user of the BEECHNUT mark. 233

On the other hand, if a change in formula leads to a product
that is greatly inferior, and the existing trademark is used merely
to deceive the public into believing that it is the same product as
before, then the rights of the trademark owner may well be
affected. 234 By the same token, a material change in a product
formula, whether it is better or worse, may amount to the
introduction of an entirely different product. In Independent
Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, the brand name SOLAR was
originally used for a baking powder made with alum. 2 3 5 The
assignee who purchased the mark adopted a formula made with
phosphate. 236 Baking powder manufacturers hotly disputed the
superiority of alum, phosphate, or cream of tartar as the acidic
agent, 237 and they made "much ado" of the ingredient featured in
their products. 238 Whether phosphate was an inferior ingredient
was not the issue. Here the "substitution of one important
ingredient for another" meant forfeiture of the rights the assignee
might have had based on earlier use of the SOLAR mark. 2 3 9

230.
Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 299 F. 834, 849 (D.N.J. 1924) ("Change
of formula has never indicated abandonment.").
231.
Id.
232.
Id. at 850.
233.
Id. at 850-51.
234.
See Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. at 295 ("[A] variation in formula resulting in a highly
inferior or wholly different product which is palmed off on the public in place of that upon
which the good will has been established would not justify the continued protection of the
trade-mark.").
235.
Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448, 450 (D.N.J. 1910).
236.
Id. at 454.
237.
Id. at 455.
238.
Id. at 454. Although each ingredient had the same function, the court found that
the choice "gives both character and name to [the] product." Id.
239.
Id. at 455. In Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, the court held that changing
the type of chick sold under the HY-CROSS name did not diminish the rights of the assignee
of the trademark. 303 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962). The court noted that no deception was
involved, and that the assignor himself "was not under any obligation to the public not to
change the breed of chicks he sold under the mark from time to time." Id. Similarly, the
court in General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Greenwald found that the substitution of
polyether-based for polyester-based polyurethane foam, both marketed as POLYFOAM, did
not abandon trademark rights obtained by assignment. 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 240, 243 (S.D.
Cal. 1960). Although the products were chemically different, they looked the same and only
a discerning observer could distinguish them by feel. Id. at 242.
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Generally speaking, a trademark owner who completely
changed the type of goods sold under the mark would be in the
same position as one who had never used the mark before. That is
because trademark rights arise from the use of the mark to sell a
particular type of goods. 240 A firm that had used BEECHNUT to
sell tobacco would not, by virtue of that use, have superior rights
to the use of BEECHNUT to sell umbrellas. 24 1 Therefore, changes
in a product that amount to more than a change of formula may
be important to the application of tacking.
In Big Blue Products, Inc. v. IBM Corp., IBM's application for
the trademark BIG BLUE for typewriter ribbons was opposed by
another firm that had used the same name for a variety of office
equipment. 242 IBM did not persuade the court, on its motion for
summary judgment, that it was the senior user, even though it
claimed to have been generally known as "Big Blue" for some
time. 2 4 3 IBM had not sold typewriter ribbons under the BIG BLUE
4
name until after the opposer had adopted the same term. 2 4 The
court acknowledged that IBM, because of its earlier use of BIG
BLUE, might have the power to prevent the sale of related goodsgoods, that is, that are different but close enough to be a source of
confusion. 245 However, its own right to registration depended on
246
its first use of the mark to sell "substantially identical" goods.
See 1 MCcARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:11 (stating that trademark rights do not
240.
prevent the use of the same mark on goods sufficiently different that there is no likelihood
of confusion).
McCarthy's list of marks that can "peacefully co-exist" due to differences in the
241.
goods includes UNITED airlines and UNITED van lines, DELTA airlines and DELTA
faucets, and ACE hardware and ACE bandages. Id. §§ 24-37. If the goods sold by another
firm are too different to compete, but close enough that use of a similar trademark is likely
to cause confusion as to source or sponsorship, then the senior user of the mark may act to
prevent such confusion. Id. §§ 24:1-24:2. The owner of a famous mark may prevent its use
even on entirely unrelated goods under theories of trademark dilution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(2012).
Big Blue Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072, 1073 (T.T.A.B.
242.
1991).
Id.
243.
Id. at 1074-75.
244.
See id. at 1075 n.4. Even if they were different products, goods within the
245.
trademark owner's "natural expansion of business" could still be confusing to consumers if
they were sold under a similar mark. See id.
See id. The standard of "substantially identical" goods has been repeated in a
246.
number of cases. See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 283 F.3d 690, 700-01 (5th
Cir. 2001) ("substantially identical" goods, not "substantially related" goods, is the
"dominant terminology" for tacking, but the court left open whether the former is "a proper
or improper approximation to the standard term"); Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v.
Freightliner Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074, 1078-79 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that one of
the questions to ask in tacking cases is whether "the marks [are] being used on the same or
substantially similar goods or services"); DC Comics, Inc. v. Scholastic Magazines, Inc., 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299, 301 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (referring to the use of a prior registration to
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A change in the nature of the product was an important factor
in Super Value Stores, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.2 4 7 Exxon's application
to register TIGER MART for retail convenience stores was opposed
by a firm using the name TIGER DISCOUNTER. 248 While the
opposer had used its name before Exxon had used TIGER MVART,
Exxon had previously used TIGER alone to sell petroleum
products. 249 The Board found that even overlooking the
dissimilarities in the names, the "clear difference" in the products
offered by Exxon would not permit tacking. 250 Although the
product distinction was less obvious in General Mills, the Board
did not allow Frito-Lay to tack on its prior use of ONION
FUNIONS to its current use of FUNYUNS, in part because of the
difference between the crackers associated with the former term
and the onion-flavored snacks associated with the latter. 25 1 In
Adventis, the court noted that adding ".com" to a business name
normally would preserve the commercial impression and allow
tacking to occur, but that the case might be different if a
traditional retailer
were simultaneously
converting to
internet-only sales. 2 52 Hence, when a trademark changes courts

will likely require a continuity of products as an independent
criterion for tacking.
F. Contexts for the Application of Tacking
Tacking is most clearly an issue where two parties compete
for trademark rights, and one claims priority based on its prior use

defend a later registration, where the marks and the goods are both "substantially
identical"); Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook Cty. Creamery Ass'n, 333 F. Supp.
2d 975, 986 (D. Or. 2004) (same).
247.
Super Valu Stores v. Exxon Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1542 (T.T.A.B.
1989).
248.
Id. at 1540.
249.
Id. at 1541-42.
250.
Id. at 1542; see Hansen Beverage Co. v. Cytosport, Inc., No. CV
09-0031-VBF(AGRx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120508, at *15 n. 11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009)
(rejecting bid to tack MONSTER MILK to MONSTER FOOD, and noting that the former
referred to a ready-to-drink beverage and the latter a whey protein powder); see also Viking
Boat Co., Inc. v. Viking Camper Supply, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 301 (T.T.A.B. 1975)
(refusing to grant superior rights in VIKING for recreational vehicles based on prior use
for boat trailers; a boat trailer, "even through the stretch of opposer's imagination does [not]
fall within the concept of a recreational vehicle currently maintained by the average
purchaser").
251.
General Mills, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148, 152 (T.T.A.B.
1972); but c.f., Jimlar Corp. v. The Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1216, 1221 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (finding that boots and sneakers are, for purposes of tacking,
"substantially identical" goods).
252.
Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., No. 7:02CV00611, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22436, at *19 n.11 (W.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2006).
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in commerce of a slightly different mark. This situation may be
represented on a timeline as follows:
-

MARK(A) -1 MARK(B) -1 MARK(C)

IARK(A) and MARK(C) are the marks of the firm that relies
on tacking, and that firm will achieve priority over the intervening
firm, using MARK(B), if MARK(A) and 1VIARK(C) are sufficiently
similar. 253 That was precisely the situation in many of the cases
discussed so far. 25 4 But tacking also arises in other contexts.
In some cases, the issue is framed in terms of whether the first
255 When
version of the mark has been lost through abandonment.
marks are linked by tacking, continued use of the later mark can
prevent the earlier mark, itself no longer in use, from falling into
the public domain. 256 However, abandonment is not always at
stake. 257 The trademark owner may use both versions of the
mark. 2 5 8 Here resolution of the tacking question would simply
determine which version of the mark the plaintiff must rely upon
to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. 259

See Hansen Beverage Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120508, at *13 (outlining the
253.
classic situation for tacking in a similar manner).
See, e.g., Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909-10 (2015); One Indus.,
254.
LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 2009); Quicksilver, Inc. v.
Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 2006); Forum Corp. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434,
441 (7th Cir. 1990). In some cases, the user of MARK(C) acquired MARK(A) by assignment
in an attempt to trump the user of the intervening MARK(B). See, e.g., Van Dyne-Crotty,
Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In ICON Solutions, the
court noted that success is very rarely achieved in such cases. ICON Sols. v. IKON Office
Sols., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *16 n.5 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1998).
See Jack Wolfskin GmbH & Co. v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U., 116 U.S.P.Q.2d
255.
(BNA) 1129, 1132-33 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying the tacking standard in the context of
abandonment).
See, e.g., George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 402 (4th
256.
Cir. 2009) (proof that LEFT CENTER RIGHT mark for a game was not abandoned
depended on plaintiffs ability to "tack" later use of LCR); Specht v. Google, Inc., 758 F.
Supp. 2d 570, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("[I]f the new mark [ANDROID'S DUNGEON] is the legal
equivalent of the old mark [ANDROID DATA] . . . use of the new mark does not abandon
the old mark."); McCabe-Powers Auto Body Co. v. Am. Truck Equip. Co., 150 F. Supp. 194,
198-99 (D. Or. 1957) (common law rights in AMERICAN mark were not abandoned by
change to POWERS-AMERICAN to promote identity of acquiring corporation).
See Iowa Health Sys. v. Trinity Health Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 897, 922 (C.D. Iowa
257.
2001) ("[I]mproper tacking" may, but does not necessarily, lead to the conclusion that a
prior mark has been abandoned.).
In Navistar, the plaintiff argued that tacking should be permitted only where the
258.
earlier version of the mark is no longer in use. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp. v. Freightliner
Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The court found scant authority to
support or to contradict that assertion, but ultimately saw "no reason why defendants
should not be allowed to claim priority by tacking onto the older mark even if they are still
using it." Id.
See Specht, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 583-85. In Specht, the plaintiffs failure to
259.
successfully tack meant both the abandonment of the ANDROID DATA mark and failure
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Another frequent context for a tacking analysis is where a
trademark applicant argues that its prior registration of a similar
mark prevents opposition to the current application. 260 Sometimes
the opposer is said to be barred by acquiescence. 26 1 At other times,
courts simply say that the opposer cannot be damaged by what
amounts to a duplicative registration. 26 2 In any event, the question
is whether the mark already registered is substantially identical
to the mark that is the subject of the current application. 26 3
Tacking also arises where the prior registration of a similar
mark is said to demonstrate the acquired distinctiveness of a
subsequent mark, 264 and it can determine whether a trademark
registrant has met its obligation to demonstrate continuing use. 2 6 5
Tacking analysis has been used to determine if an OLYMPIC
mark is barred by the Amateur Sports Act or "grandfathered" in, 2 6 6
and it has shed light on the interpretation of a license governing
the use of the VO5 shampoo trademark in Asia. 2 6 7 Essentially,
whenever courts have considered whether two marks, though
technically different, are alike enough to be treated as the same,
they have called upon the tacking doctrine explicitly, or the
to establish the necessary priority for the currently-used ANDROID'S DUNGEON mark.
Id.
260.
See, e.g., Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 884 (C.C.P.A.
1969); S & L Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221, 1225
(T.T.A.B. 1987); DC Comics, Inc. v. Scholastic Magazines, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299,
301 (T.T.A.B. 1980).
261.
See Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook Cty. Creamery Ass'n, 333 F.
Supp. 2d 975, 986 n.7 (D. Or. 2004) ("[The prior-registration doctrine is considered one in
the nature of laches or acquiescence.").
262.
See, e.g., Morehouse, 407 F.2d at 884; Place for Vision, Inc. v. Pearle Vision Ctr.,
Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1022, 1023 (T.T.A.B. 1983); DC Comics, 210 U.S.P.Q. at 301.
263.
See S & L Acquisition, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1225 (The defense requires a prior
registration "for the same or substantially identical mark and for the same or substantially
identical goods andlor services."); DC Comics, 210 U.S.P.Q. at 301 (same). A similar
circumstance is where res judicata threatens to bar litigation with respect to a mark that
is legally indistinguishable from a mark previously challenged (or defended) by the same
party. See Old Grantian Co. v. William Grant & Sons, Ltd. 361 F.2d 1018, 1019 (C.C.P.A.
1966); Polaroid Corp. v. C & E Vision Servs., Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954, 1955-56
(T.T.A.B. 1999); Institut National Des Appellations d'Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1875, 1894 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
264.
See, e.g., In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2001); In re Flex-O-Glass Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 205-06 (T.T.A.B. 1977); 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.41(b) (2015) ("In appropriate cases, ownership of one or more active prior registrations
on the Principal Register or under the Act of 1905 of the same mark may be accepted as
prima facie evidence of distinctiveness.").
265.
See Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 13-cv-214, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26932, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2014); Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle
Assocs., Inc., 205 F. Supp. 940, 942 (D.N.J. 1962).
266.
O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
267.
Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009) ('"[T]acking
on' becomes a guide to interpretation of the license.").
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standard of similarity developed in tacking cases. That standard,
its ambiguities, and its rationale are discussed in Part III.
Although courts have treated the tacking standard as applicable
in all of these contexts, I will argue later that its universal
application may be a mistake. 268
III. THE "EXCEEDINGLY STRICV' STANDARD OF TACKING.
The clearest thing one can say about tacking is that it is
seldom allowed. This is a theme repeated in countless tacking
cases-even those that permit the uncommon exception. Tacking
is said to be condoned "only in rare instances," 269 or under
'exceptionally narrow' circumstances," 270 because the standard for
tacking is "exceedingly strict." 271 Nevertheless, as the Ninth
Circuit observed in Hana, "the fact that the [tacking] doctrine
rarely applies does not mean that it never will." 2 7 2 The Supreme
Court reassures us that any concern regarding the improper
application of the tacking standard can be resolved through
"careful jury instructions that make [the] standard clear." 2 7 3 It is
worth considering; therefore, whether the courts have told us
enough to make the "exceedingly strict" standard of tacking clear
to the jury that will apply it.
A.

"ContinuingCommercial Impression"

In Navistar, the court called the tacking test "relatively
simple." 2 7 4 The test is simple in the sense that courts tend to

See infra Part III. C.
268.
See George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 402 (4th Cir.
269.
2009) (quoting Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1991)); The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1635 (T.T.A.B.
2007); Big Blue Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072, 1075 (T.T.A.B. 1991);
see also Data Concepts, Inc. v. Dig. Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1998)
("[T]acking should be permitted 'only in rare circumstances."' (internal citation omitted)).
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
270.
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999));
see also One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009);
Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., No. 7:02CV00611, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22436, at *13 (W.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2006); Levi Strauss & Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d
971, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
271.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1048); see One Indus., 578 F.3d at 1160; see also Specht v. Google,
Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("A stringent standard exists for a mark owner
to prove tacking, and a court should rarely grant it."); ICON Sols. v. IKON Office Sols., No.
97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *16 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1998) (describing the
tacking standard as "very rigorous").
Hana, 735 F.3d at 1168.
272.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 912 (2015).
273.
Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074, 1078
274.
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describe it consistently and in relatively few words. In its
influential Van Dyne-Crotty decision, the Federal Circuit said that
"[t]he previously used mark must be the legal equivalent of the
mark in question or indistinguishable therefrom, and the
consumer should consider both as the same mark." 2 75 Further, "the
marks must create 'the same continuing commercial impression,'
and the later mark should not materially differ from or alter the
character of the mark. . . ."276 Although one can find a few cases
speaking of "key" or "dominant" features shared by the marks in
question, 277 the Federal Circuit's language is in the ascendant.
Nearly all cases demand that the marks to be tacked convey the
same "commercial impression," 278 and a great many suggest that
this condition is met only when consumers regard them as "the
same mark." 279 The jury instruction given in Hana and reproduced
by the Supreme Court without criticism, closely mirrors the
Van-Dyne Crotty vocabulary. 280
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
275.
Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
276.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
277.
See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 955 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("So long as the owner continues use of the 'key element' of the registered mark,
courts generally will not find abandonment."); Miyano Mach. USA, Inc. v. Mianohitec
Mach., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 868, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding no abandonment where "key
elements of the mark remain"); Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook Cty.
Creamery Ass'n, 333 F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (D. Or. 2004) (referring to "dominant feature[s]"
in the context of a prior registration defense); Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assocs.,
Inc., 205 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D.N.J. 1962) ("[T]he essential features of the
trademark ... were still in use .... ); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1245
(D. Kan. 1977) ("A change in a mark that does not affect the distinctive characteristics of
the mark represents a continuity of the prior mark.").
278.
See, e.g., Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 910; George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd.,
575 F.3d 383, 402 (4th Cir. 2009); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Dig. Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d
620, 623 (6th Cir. 1998); Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir.
2006). In Navistar, the court identified the "fundamental inquiry" as whether a change
affects the commercial impression conveyed by the mark, not whether in some other respect
it "alters the character" of the mark. Navistar, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1078 n.5. Any change at
all would, in some manner, alter the character of the mark, so a literal prohibition would
make any change impermissible. Id. The court also found a material difference approach
problematic or unnecessary because a difference could be "material" only if it altered the
mark's commercial impression. Id. The jury instruction given in Hana did state that the
later mark should not 'materially differ from or alter the character of the mark attempted
to be tacked,"' and the Supreme Court reproduced this language without criticism. Hana,
135 S. Ct. at 910.
279.
See, e.g., Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 910; George, 575 F.3d at 402; Data Concepts, 150
F.3d. at 623; Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047-48
(9th Cir. 1999).
"In the jury instructions, the district court explained:
280.
'A party may claim priority in a mark based on the first use date of a similar but
technically distinct mark where the previously used mark is the legal equivalent
of the mark in question or indistinguishable therefrom such that consumers
consider both as the same mark. This is called 'tacking.' The marks must create
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Whether the altered mark still conveys the same commercial
impression must be judged from the perspective of consumers.281
The marks must be viewed as a whole, 282 and no portion may be
ignored. 28 3 The standard for tacking is not the familiar
likelihood-of-confusion test 2 8 4 used to evaluate potential
trademark infringement. 2 8 5 The first version of a mark and the
altered version may be similar enough that consumers would
confuse them, yet not so similar that they convey the same
commercial impression. 286 On the other hand, if the two marks are
different enough that they are not likely to be confused, then they
are necessarily different enough to fall short of tacking's more
demanding standard. 287

the same, continuing commercial impression, and the later mark should not
materially differ from or alter the character of the mark attempted to be tacked."'
Hana, 735 F.3d at 1163.
281.
Hana, 135 S. Ct. at 910; Navistar, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1079 ("As for whose
impression matters, it is the impression of consumers for the product at issue that
matters."); Nat'l Bakers Servs., Inc. v. Hain Pure Food Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 701, 707
(T.T.A.B. 1980) (referring to the perspective of the "purchasing public"). As the court stated
in Adventis, the consumer's perspective is important "because it is the consumer's
conclusion that is material." Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., No.
7:02CV00611, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *17 (W.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2006).
282.
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 362
(11th Cir. 1997), modified by Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc.,
122 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 1997); Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[O]ur inquiry must focus on both marks in their entirety . . . ."); The
Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1637 (T.T.A.B. 2007); KeyCorp.
v. Key Bank & Tr., 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Oh. 2000) ("[Clourts may not split marks
into their component parts in determining whether they may be tacked, but rather must
evaluate the impression which the mark as a whole creates."); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Optimist
Int'l, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 127 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (The commercial impression of a mark is
"engendered by the sum total of its parts rather than by any single element thereof.").
283.
O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
284.
See supra Part II.A.
285.
George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 402 (4th Cir. 2009)
("Legal equivalence for tacking purposes does not exist simply because the two marks a
party seeks to tack are 'confusingly similar."'); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (The tacking standard "is considerably
higher than the standard for 'likelihood of confusion."'); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Dig.
Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1998); Pro-Cuts v. Schilz-Price Enters., Inc.,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224, 1227 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
286.
Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc. 971 F.2d 732, 735 (Fed. Cir.
1992) ("[F]or the purposes of 'tacking,' even if the two marks are confusingly similar, they
still may not be legal equivalents." (quoting Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159)); Am.
Paging, Inc. v. Am. Mobilphone, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2036, 2038 (T.T.A.B. 1989). As
stated in Hansen, the standard of similarity for tacking is "different and more stringent"
than the standard of similarity for infringement. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120508 at *16.
287.
See Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159 n.3 ("We ...
affirm the Board's finding
that because the marks were not confusingly similar, they were not legal equivalents for
the purposes of tacking.").
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The burden of proof rests with the party that claims the
benefit of tacking.28 8 Sometimes the decision requires no more
than a comparison of the original and the altered versions of the
mark. 289 A court may take into account both the visual effects of
the change and, in the case of word marks, changes in
pronunciation. 2 90 However, a court should not speculate about the
effect of a change on consumer impressions, 29 1 particularly after
the Supreme Court has determined that commercial impression is
an issue of fact. 2 92 Consumer impressions may be shown directly
through anecdotal evidence, or through surveys designed for the
purpose. 293 A court may also consider the intentions of the
trademark owner; if the owner revised the mark in order to change
consumer impressions, the objective was likely achieved. 294 It
might be argued that well known trademarks are more immune to
changes in commercial impression because the impression is

&

288.
Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., No. 7:02CV00611, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22436, at *18 n.10 (W.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2006).
289.
In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("No
evidence need be entertained other than the visual or aural appearance of the marks
themselves."); Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159.
290.
See Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013) ("In
determining whether the marks have the same commercial impression, the visual or aural
appearance may be instructive."); Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 623; Fifth Ave. of Long Island
Realty Assocs. v. Caruso Mgmt. Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that
marks were "aurally and visually dissimilar because of the addition of a new word").
291.
See Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1812 (S.D.
Tex. 2013); see also Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1074, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("Because the inquiry is how consumers perceive the marks,
there must be some evidence demonstrating those perceptions.").
292.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015). As was said in Adventis,
"[t]he opinion of a court sitting in its ivory tower sheds no light on an issue in which the
everyday consumer is the more adept expert." Adventis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *17.
293.
See Hana, 735 F.3d at 1164 ("Commercial impression ...
should be resolved by
considering a range of evidence, ideally including consumer survey evidence."); Adventis,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *18 n.10 (stating that probative evidence includes
"[a]necdotal or more broad-based evidence of consumer perception"); Reynolds Consumer
Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 13-cv-214, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26932, at *12 n.5
(E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2014) (referring to a study showing that "'the vast majority of target
buyers fail to recognize that Reynolds packaging has been modified""). In Louangel, the
court warned that "an "eyeball" comparison, alone, does not end the inquiry as "the
similarity of marks depends on evidence about the perceptions of consumers in the relevant
market-considerations which an aural and visual comparison does not necessarily reveal
to the full extent necessary." Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q. at 1813 (internal citation omitted).
See Adventis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22436, at *18 n.10 (listing the "[i]ntent or
294.
purpose of the mark holder" among the varieties of probative evidence). In Keycorp, the
defendant intended to distance itself from unsavory associations with the savings and loan
crisis. This was a significant factor in the court's determination that dropping SAVINGS
LOAN from the mark did change its commercial impression. KeyCorp. v. Key Bank & Tr.,
99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Oh. 2000); see also Louangel, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1814 (finding
that the owner of the mark intended changes to communicate a more upscale image).
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already firmly established. 295 However, it is not clear that the fame
of the mark is a factor at all. 2 96

B. Meaning and PotentialAmbiguities
A jury asked to determine whether a change affected the
commercial impression of a mark, or whether, after the change,
consumers would regard it as "the same mark," might well ask for
clarification. "Commercial impression," though a key term, has
been only loosely defined. This may be why courts applying the
same standard have sometimes reached "apparently inconsistent
decisions."297
As expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Hana, "[t]he 'commercial
impression' of a trademark is the meaning or idea it conveys or the
mental reaction it evokes." 2 9 8 It can include information about the

products with which the mark is associated, 29 9 and ideas unrelated
to those products-an example being the connotations evoked by
the addition of DUNGEON to the ANDROID trademark in
Specht.300 Many cases further associate the commercial impression
of a mark with its "impact," apparently referring to the mark's
psychological effects. 301 The commercial impression of a mark
295.
See Specht v. Google Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("Plaintiffs
justifiably do not argue that ANDROID DATA qualifies as a famous mark for which more
substantial alterations could possibly maintain a similar commercial impression.").
296.
See The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1636
(T.T.A.B. 2007) ("[T]he fame of ELIZABETH ARDEN, even if proven, would not be a factor
in our determination.").
297.
Fifth Ave. of Long Island Realty Assocs. v. Caruso Mgmt. Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d
292, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted).
298.
Hana, 735 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Gideon Mark & Jacob Jacoby, Continuing
Commercial Impression:Applications and Measurement, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
433, 434 (2006)); see also Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1074, 1078 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Curiously, this definition of "commercial impression"
as used in tacking cases can be traced back to Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co.,
505 F.2d 1293, 1296 (C.C.P.A. 1974), a case that used "commercial impression" only in the
context of deciding whether two competing marks were likely to be confused. See id. at
1295-96 ("Of paramount interest is not the descriptive nature of SPICE, but the overall
c mmercial impression derived by viewing the marks in their entireties in determining
whether a likelihood of confusion exists." (footnote omitted)).
299.
See ICON Sols. v. IKON Office Sols., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at
*22 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1998) (suggesting that a trademark's commercial impression will
change if it "provide[s] potential customers with new and different information about the
[mark owner's] products and services.").
300.
See 758 F. Supp. 2d 570, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
301.
See Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1976)
(altered mark must "retain its trademark impact and symbolize a single and continuing
commercial impression"); Corp. Fitness Programs, Inc. v. Weider Health and Fitness Inc.,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1687 (P.T.A.B. 1987); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sekisui Chem.
Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597, 603 (T.T.A.B. 1970); Jay-Zee, Inc. v. Hartfield-Zodys, Inc., 207
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 269, 271-72 (T.T.A.B. 1980) (finding that the change from THE IMAGE to
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includes the "image" it projects, 302 and the "emphasis" it
conveys. 303 Perhaps even subliminal associations of the kind
discussed in Dreyfus play a role. 304 If So, the nuances of commercial
impression may be limitless in their subtlety.
It is reasonable to assume that a trademark owner seldom
alters a mark unless it is to change something about its "image" or
"impact," or the information it conveys. Otherwise, why bother? So
it comes as no surprise that tacking is allowed "only in rare
instances." 305 A few cases introduce some flexibility through
qualifying words, saying that what is important for tacking is
continuity of the trademark's "basic, overall commercial
impression." 306 Others suggest that very little flexibility is
contemplated, and that tacking is permitted only where the
original and the altered marks are "virtually identical." 30 7 Some
change must be permitted; otherwise there would be no room for
tacking at all. What, then, does it mean to change a mark, but in
such a way that consumers still consider it the "same mark," with
the same commercial impression?
One answer is to say that tacking is reserved for situations
where a consumer would not have noticed the change. This could
certainly have been the case in American Security, where few
customers were likely to remember whether the word BANK had
always been a part of the AMERICAN SECURITY BANK

simply IMAGE did not change the "psychological and marketing impact" of the trademark).
See S & L Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221, 1226
302.
(T.T.A.B. 1987) (tacking requires that an altered mark "project the same image"); Nat'l
Bakers Servs., Inc. v. Hain Pure Food Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 701, 707 (T.T.A.B. 1980).
See General Mills, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148, 153 (T.T.A.B.
303.
1972).
See Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 (S.D.N.Y.
304.
1981).
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
305.
See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 955 (7th
306.
Cir. 1992); Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 255 (D.P.R. 1992). In
Laura Scudder's, the court found that the BLUE BIRD and BLUE ROBIN marks conveyed
"substantially the same general impression." Laura Scudder's v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co.,
136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418, 419 (T.T.A.B. 1962). Other cases have introduced similar
qualifying language with respect to whether the mark, after the change, was still "the same
mark." See, e.g., Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (tacking
is allowed "where the two marks are so similar that consumers would generally regard them
as being the same" (emphasis added)); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999). (tacking is allowed where consumers would regard the
marks as "essentially the same" (emphasis added)).
One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009);
307.
ICON Sols. v. IKON Office Sols., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *20 (E.D. Pa.
June 12, 1998); Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1813
(S.D. Tex. 2013).
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trademark, 308 or Hess's, where consumers may not have noticed
that HESS had assumed the possessive form. 309 A change that no
one notices cannot alter the trademark's meaning or impact,
unless the effect is indeed subliminal. A number of tacking cases
have discussed whether a change would have been perceived. In
KeyCorp, the court rejected as "somewhat disingenuous" the claim
that consumers would not have noticed the replacement of
SAVINGS & LOAN. 3 10 In Reynolds, the survey evidence showed
that "the vast majority of target buyers" would not have realized
that designs on the aluminum foil packaging had changed,3 1 1
The smallest alteration in a trademark could, of course, be
made plain to a juror. The question is whether a consumer in the
marketplace, who likely would not see the marks side-by-side for
comparison, would have noticed a difference amid the usual
distractions of life. Moreover, just as likelihood of confusion cannot
rest solely on the perceptions of "the careful and scrupulous
shopper," 3 12 but instead must consider the "ordinary consumer
using ordinary care under ordinary buying conditions," 313 tacking
should rely on the perspective of the more casual observer. 314 As
the court observed in Dreyfus: "advertising and trademarks rely
on impressions. The consumer does not memorize the mark. He
has a feeling about it from past exposure." 315 A change that would
be revealed only by "careful inspection," 316 or through a
"painstakingly careful comparison," 3 17 should not, and does not,
stand in the way of tacking.
One objection to unnoticeability as the standard for tacking is
that courts must have something else in mind or they would not
have missed so many opportunities to make the standard clearer
than it is. Another is that even if unnoticeable changes allow
tacking, it does not follow that every noticeable change forbids it.
In other words, it is possible that a change would be noticed, but
that it would not alter the commercial impression of the mark or
308.
See Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Sec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, 272 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
309.
See Hess's of Allentown, Inc. v. Nat'1 Bellas Hess, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673,
677 (T.T.A.B. 1971).
310.
KeyCorp. v. Key Bank & Tr., 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (N.D. Oh. 2000).
311.
Reynolds Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Handi-Foil Corp., No. 13-cv-214, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26932, at *12 n.5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2014).
312.
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977).
313.
Id.
314.
See Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 887 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
("[A] casual observer might well say it was the identical mark.").
315.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1123 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
316.
Morehouse, 407 F.2d at 884.
317.
Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 255 (D.P.R. 1992).
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prevent consumers from continuing to regard the mark as the
same.3 18 If "commercial impression" includes every one of the
subtle mental reactions stimulated by a trademark, this situation
may be an impossibility. On the other hand, tacking is likely to
happen often if one looks only at changes to the mark that affect
consumer impressions about source or product characteristics.For
example, a previously black-and-white logo could be replaced by
an otherwise identical but brightly-colored logo. The change could
well be noticed, and it could even affect the "impact" of the mark
in a general sense, but it would not likely alter consumer
perceptions of brand origin or communicate any new information
about the product.
Whether such a limited focus is proper is uncertain.
319 of
Brookfield refers to preserving the "identificatory function"
the mark, suggesting an emphasis on continuity of information
about brand origin or product characteristics. In Hana, the Ninth
Circuit speculated that the terms OVERSEAS KOREAN CLUB
and WORLD CENTER would have told consumers nothing they
did not already know about the source of the banking services or
their nature. 320 In American Security, the court noted that the
addition of BANK added nothing to the origin-indicating
significance of mark, 321 and many tacking cases refer to continuity
of the "distinctive character" of the mark, suggesting that one is
interested in the attributes that help to distinguish one brand or
type of product from another. 322 However, the court in Spice

Some cases suggest that tacking is permitted where the original mark and the
318.
altered mark "would be recognized as one and the same." See, e.g., Gulf States Paper Corp.
v. E-Z Por Corp., 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 569 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Hess's of Allentown, Inc. v.
Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 677 (T.T.A.B. 1971). This language does
not suggest that the change would be unnoticed, but rather that continuity would be
perceived in spite of the change.
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th
319.
Cir. 1999).
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013).
320.
See Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Sec. and Tr. Co., 571 F.2d 564, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
321.
("[Tihe word 'bank' is purely descriptive and adds nothing to the origin-indicating
significance of AMERICAN SECURITY.").
See, e.g., Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221, 1224 (C.C.P.A.
322.
1976) ("[A] change which does not alter [the mark's] distinctive characteristics represents
a continuity of trademark rights." (quoting Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sekisui Chem. Co.,
165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597, 603 (T.T.A.B. 1970))); Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1815 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Corp. Fitness Programs, Inc. v. Weider
Health and Fitness, Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1687 (P.T.A.B. 1987); Feed Flavors, Inc.
v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 360, 363 (T.T.A.B. 1982). In Jay-Zee, Inc. v.
Hartfield-Zodys, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 269, 271 (T.T.A.B. 1980), the Board noted that
the changed outline "contribute [d] little, if anything, to the origin-indicating utility of [the]
mark," and the change "[did] not affect the continuity of commercial impression of the
distinctive elements of [the] mark." In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit remarked
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Islands warned that "[a]rguments to the effect that one portion of
a mark possesses no trademark significance leading to direct
comparison between only what remains is an erroneous
approach." 323 In Wet Seal, the court observed that a word like
BEAUTY, which has little trademark significance on its own in
the field of cosmetics, "nonetheless contributes to the overall
commercial impression .

."324 Moreover, many cases find marks

too dissimilar for tacking where the differences seem to have
nothing to do with identifying brand origin or product
characteristics. Examples include the design alterations discussed
in One Indus,325 and the shortening of the slogan in Van
Dyne-Crotty.3 26
C. A Policy Perspective
If there is ambiguity in the current standard, it may be
helpful to consider the policies that account for the existence of the
tacking doctrine. In Hana, the Ninth Circuit called the reasons for
tacking "compelling." 327 Courts have observed that trademarks
may need to change to keep up with marketing innovations and
evolving tastes. 328 Trademark owners would hesitate to make such
changes if it meant putting their investments in jeopardy. Because
of the tacking doctrine, a trademark owner can make a small
change in the mark without risking giving up seniority, and the
rights that come with it, to a junior user. 329 This should lead to
that "courts have upheld tacking claims where additional words in one mark do not help
identify the origin of the goods." HGI Mktg. Servs. v. Pepsico, Inc., Nos. 93-55968, 93-56370,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4532, at *5 (9th Cir. 1995).
323.
Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1295 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
324.
The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1636 (T.T.A.B.
2007).
325.
See One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir.
2009).
326.
See Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp,, 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
327.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013).
328.
The court in VeryFine refers to "the dynamic, changing nature of trademarks in
commerce ..
Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 255 (D.P.R. 1992).
T.."
Trademarks, the court observed, "do not exist in a static environment;" they are "constantly
affected by changing social conditions . . . ."Id. A website calling itself Brand New documents
countless updates, large and small, in the trademarks used by a wide variety of firms.
BRANDNEW, http://www.underconsideration.com/brandnew [https://perma.cc/U4YF-MXPW1.
329.
See Hana, 735 F.3d at 1164 ("'[Without tacking, a trademark owner's priority in
his mark would be reduced each time he made the slightest alteration to the mark, which
would discourage him from altering the mark in response to changing consumer
preferences, evolving aesthetic developments, or new advertising and marketing styles."'
(quoting Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir.
1999))); Levi Strauss & Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 971, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2002). As
the court said in Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., "the tacking doctrine should
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more vigorous competition among businesses and brands better
suited to the times.
In Sunstar, Judge Posner recognized the need for trademark
owners to conform their marketing to "unpredictable fluctuations
in consumer response." 330 He imagined a hypothetically
trademarked phrase "First Aid for His Thirst," adopted when male
pronouns were used indiscriminately to refer to both genders. 3 31
"As language conventions evolved," the user of the trademark
might think it "essential" to substitute "First Aid for Your
Thirst." 332 He noted that "stubbornly clinging to a dowdy,
old-fashioned, 'un-modernized' original mark" might pose an
"acute danger" of devaluing the brand. 333 Yet without the
protections of tacking, modifying a mark to keep up with changing
needs would pose acute dangers of its own, particularly if the
trademark owner could not be sure whether there were
intervening users of similar marks who could now claim priority.
Louangel provides an actual example of an evolving brand
identity. The Longhorn Steaks restaurant chain remodeled their
facilities to replace their "roadhouse styling" with something
offering "a more upscale image." 3 3 4 They installed "warmer,

golden-toned lighting" in place of neon, they substituted "earth-tone
fabrics" for red vinyl tablecloths, and they removed examples of the
taxidermist's art. 3 35 They "reimaged" the menu, the china, and the
uniforms worn by the staff.33 6 It was all part of an effort to "evol[ve]
the brand" and "keep it competitive" by appealing to a broad range
of customers "from high chairs to wheel chairs." 33 7 Replacing the old
logo and its cartoon cow "Bongo" with a classier "minimalist" logo
was a part of that evolution. 338 In this case, the court found that the
changes to the logo went too far to permit tacking. 339
The Longhorn Steaks transformation recalls well-publicized
changes to the Ruby Tuesday restaurant chain. 340 In a similar
be allowed so that a trademark holder's rights are not thwarted by every minuscule change
or variation in a mark that continues to convey the same impression." 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22436, at *13.
Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009).
330.
Id.
331.
332.
Id.
Id. at 497.
333.
Louangel, Inc. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809, 1814 (S.D. Tex.
334.
2013).
Id.
335.
Id.
336.
Id.
337.
338.
Id.
Id. at 1815.
339.
See David Segal, At Ruby Tuesday, Casual Dining Dons a Blazer, N.Y. TIMES
340.
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effort to go upscale, the owners upgraded their menu, their staff
uniforms, and their d6cor (formerly dominated by "rummage-sale
bric-a-brac"). 34 1 As observed in a New York Times article, "[t]he
trick [was] for the company to elevate its image without alienating
those customers who actually liked the dowdier original." 342 The
owners dropped "Bar and Grill" from the Ruby Tuesday name, 343
and they adopted a new logo. 34 4 The new version retains the Ruby
Tuesday name and the "Ruby" portion appears in the same shade
of burgundy red. But now "Ruby" and "Tuesday" appear together
on one line (without a separating space), "Tuesday" is black
instead of red, "Simple Fresh American Cuisine" has been added
in small type, and the font is sleeker and more modern, omitting
the gaudy "bric-a-brac" embellishments of the original.
Up to a point, the tacking doctrine allows firms to modify their
trademarks to reflect changes in their businesses. The altered
mark itself may contribute something to the consumer's
experience; 345 at the very least, it provides a more accurate
impression of what the consumer should expect. It would have sent
mixed signals indeed for Ruby Tuesday to have transformed its
restaurants but retained its garish logo. To the extent that it
means better information for customers and makes businesses
more responsive to market demands, the tacking doctrine is a boon
to consumers. It also helps consumers in the manner of trademark
laws in general-by reducing the likelihood of confusion and the
costs of deciding what to purchase. 346 If a trademark carried an
established reputation but a slight modification meant the loss of
rights to a junior user, consumers could easily be misled. 34 7
(Nov. 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/business/08ruby.html?rref=collection%
2Ftimestopic%2FRuby%2OTuesday%2OInc.&action=click&contentCollection=business&re
gion=stream&module=stream unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collecti
on [https://perma.cclL9PS-V4QQ].
Id.
341.
Id.
342.
343.
Id.
344.
For reproduction of the logos, see the Brand New website archive. A Fresh Identity
Tue Impress, BRAND NEW (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.underconsideration.comibrand
new/archives/a freshidentity-tue impress.php [https://perma.cc/M8C4-4YNW].
345.
See Alan L. Durham, Trademarks and the Landscape of Imagination, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 1181, 1208-18 (2006) (discussing the effect of associative marketing and evocative
trademarks on the value of consumer goods).
346.
See Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Giving
the trademark owner the same rights in the new mark as he has in the old helps to protect
source-identifying trademarks from appropriation by competitors and thus furthers the
trademark law's objective of reducing the costs that customers incur in shopping and
making purchasing decisions." (quoting Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999))).
347.
See id. at 1168 (tacking exists "to protect consumers from being misled about the
source of products and facilitate their purchasing decisions").
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Imagine what might have happened if a restaurant calling itself
Ruby Thursday had opened just before the Ruby Tuesday
transformation and a court did not allow tacking.
The reasons for tacking do seem compelling and courts have
acknowledged them often, so one must ask why tacking is allowed
only under "'exceptionally narrow' circumstances." 34 8 What are
the dangers to be feared from too liberal an application of the
tacking doctrine? Here courts are silent. While they often say
that tacking is rarely permitted, 349 this conclusion is supported
by recitations of precedent, not by discussions of policy. It may be
that tacking is severely limited because it is a departure from the
"cardinal principle" of trademark law that rights must go to the
senior user of the mark. 350 Courts may also see disadvantages in
allowing trademarks to be changeable "moving targets" that
could hinder the actions of potential competitors. Firms adopting
new trademarks are said to have a responsibility to avoid
confusion with existing markS 35 1-a responsibility enforced by
resolving issues of confusion against the junior user. That
responsibility would be difficult to fulfill if the commercial
could change in
of existing trademarks
impressions
unpredictable ways.
Nevertheless, if courts are motivated by the interests of
consumers, the restrictive manner in which they currently apply
the tacking doctrine seems deeply flawed, and not merely by
discouraging businesses from keeping up with changing demand.
Consumers benefit from trademarks, and trademark laws, when
they facilitate the flow of useful information about products and
their source. However, when a trademark owner alters a mark to
provide consumers with more information than before, or more
accurate information, that in itself changes the commercial
impression of the mark and leaves the owner vulnerable to the loss

Hana, 735 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047).
348.
See, e.g., Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear Guard Corp, 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed.
349.
Cir. 1991).
One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009).
350.
See D&J Master Clean, Inc. v. Servicemaster Co., 181 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (S.D.
351.
Oh. 2002) ("It is the second user's responsibility to avoid confusion in its choice of a
trademark . . . ."); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 562
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Much of the foregoing would be irrelevant but for defendants' status as a
'second comer' to the market with its consequent responsibility to avoid confusion.");
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1242-43 (D. Kan. 1977) (finding that a
defendant who adopted a confusingly similar design proceeded "at his own peril"). On the
other hand, while a firm adopting a new trademark can search for previously-used marks
that might be confusingly similar, it can never be certain that such marks will not
eventually come to light. See Hana, 735 F.3d at 1167.
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of its trademark rights. 352 It is difficult to see how this benefits
trademark owner or consumers.
Consider the situation in American Paging. A company that
had used the name AMERICAN MOBILPHONE introduced a new
mark, AMERICAN MOBILPHONE PAGING, to convey to
consumers that it offered both mobile phone and paging
services. 353 Consistent design elements, as well as the words
AMERICAN MOBILPHONE, would have told customers of the
mobile phone services that paging services were offered by the
same firm. 35 4 Such information could be valuable to the public.
However, because the addition of PAGING "conveyed more
information to potential customers," the marks carried different
commercial impressions and could not be tacked. 355 A mark that is
"more informative" is, in relation to the tacking doctrine, "legally
different." 356
The consequences in American Paging may have been limited
357
because the trademark owner continued to use its former mark.
But one can easily imagine a situation where a company changes its
product to meet new demand, adds something to its trademark to
convey useful information about the change, retains elements of the
original mark to convey continuity of source, and otherwise abandons
its use of the now outdated original. Let us imagine, for example, that
a restaurant using the trademark TEXAS CHUCKWAGON adopted
a purely vegetarian menu to accommodate changing tastes, it

See The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1637
352.
(T.T.A.B. 2007) (A mark that "imparts additional information" does not convey the same
commercial impression.); ICON Sols. v. IKON Office Sols., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist.
limited [tacking] to
LEXIS 9101, at *21 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1998) ("[Djecisions have ...
situations where the additional term adds no new information for potential consumers.");
Fifth Ave. of Long Island Realty Assocs. v. Caruso Mgmt. Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that the addition of a specific geographic identifier "necessarily
creates a new impression"). Some cases have allowed tacking because the changes to the
mark did not alter the information provided to consumers. See, e.g., Hana, 735 F.3d at 1167
(finding that altered portions of the mark "merely conveyed what the ordinary purchasers
would already have surmised"); Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Sec. and Tr. Co., 571 F.2d 564, 567
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (indicating that the addition of BANK did not prevent tacking where
customers already knew they were dealing with a bank).
See 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2036, 2038 (T.T.A.B. 1989). "Customers who simply saw
353.
the mark AMERICAN MOBILPHONE and design and who simply utilized registrant's
mobile phone services, would not know they were dealing with a company that also
rendered paging services." Id. at 2039.
The court "recognize[d] that visually registrant's two marks are quite similar."
354.
Id. at 2039. Both marks were "dominated by the word AMERICAN and the same star and
double bar design," and in each case "[t]he words MOBILPHONE and MOBILPHONE
PAGING [were] . . . depicted in subordinate fashion." Id.
355.
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2038.
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substituted the more informative mark TEXAS CHUCKWAGON
FRESH/VEGAN, and it abandoned TEXAS CHUCKWAGON alone
because it no longer conveyed an accurate impression. Adding
FRESH/VEGAN provides new and useful information, while
retaining TEXAS CHUCKWAGON accurately conveys continuity of
source. Further imagine that shortly before the change, another
restaurant opened calling itself TEX'S CHUCKWAGON. If the first
restaurant had an established reputation, consumers who patronized
the second might do so under a false impression. Nevertheless, the
first restaurant could be vulnerable in a suit for trademark
infringement, simply because it had adapted its mark to be "more in
accord with the facts and the times." 35 8

IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The likelihood of confusion standard that governs
infringement has an obvious connection to the paramount goal of
trademark law-to prevent such confusion. The same commercial
impression standard of tacking has no obvious connection to any
policy objective. Courts often say that the standard for tacking is
not likelihood of confusion,3 59 and it is plain that it should not be
if tacking merely involves the comparison of an original mark to a
revised mark. Whether consumers would "confuse" those marks is
a non sequitur. But if one were devising a standard for tacking
based on the interests of consumers, the potential for confusing
either mark with the intervening mark could play a role.
For the moment, let us limit ourselves to the paradigmatic
three-mark situation. A firm replaces MARK(A) with MARK(C),
and in the meantime another firm begins using MARK(B).
1VIARK(B) and MARK(C) cannot co-exists due to a likelihood of
confusion. The first firm sues the second for trademark
infringement. Both firms assert priority-the defendant because it
used 1VIARK(B) before IVIARK(C), the plaintiff because it claims it
can tack on its earlier use of MARK(A). A court would ask a jury to
determine whether MVARK(A) and MARK(C) convey the same
commercial impression, so that consumers would consider them
"the same mark." Perhaps a court should, instead, ask the jury to
compare both 1IARK(A) and MARK(C) to MARK(B), and determine
whether the confusion that now exists was or was not caused by the
change. 360 The jury instruction might be expressed as follows:
358.
Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 299 F. 834, 838 (D.N.J. 1924).
359.
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
360.
In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit seemed close to adopting this approach, even
though the opinion includes the "same commercial impression" tacking standard found in
most cases. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th
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Changes to plaintiffs mark that occurred after defendant's
adoption of the mark accused of infringement shall not affect
plaintiffs status as the senior user, unless the likelihood of
confusion between the marks would not otherwise have
occurred.
If we return to the TEXAS CHUCKWAGON FRESHVEGAN
hypothetical, it is obvious that any confusion between this mark
and TEX'S CHUCKWAGON is not because of the addition of the
term FRESHNEGAN to the former. The confusion arose when
TEX'S CHUCKWAGON began doing business under that mark. If
it had been sued immediately, it would have lost. The outcome
should not be different because, fortuitously, the original TEXAS
CHUCKWAGON updated its mark to give consumers information
about its revised menu-information that may change the
commercial impression of the mark but that is unrelated to the
confusion. On the other hand, if the defendant used the name
TEXAS KITCHEN FRESHVEGAN the outcome would likely be
different. TEXAS KITCHEN FRESHNEGAN might be confused
with TEXAS CHUCKWAGON FRESHNEGAN, but not with the
original TEXAS CHUCKWAGON alone. If that is the case, the
change itself is the source of the confusion. Here it would be the
original restaurant that failed in its responsibility to avoid
choosing a (revised) mark that would cause confusion with other
marks already in use. 36 1 The injury to consumers is traceable to its
actions, not to those of the intervener. 362
Cir. 1999). The court referred to J Wiss & Sons v. WE. Basset & Co., 462 F.2d 567 (C.C.P.A.
1972), a case involving a "three-competing-trademark situation." Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1049. One company switched from QUICK-TRIM to TRIMLINE, and the other company, in
the meantime, adopted TRIM alone. TRIM was confusingly similar to TRIMLINE, but not
to the earlier QUICK-TRIM. Id. The court awarded priority to the intervening mark,
concluding that "priority depended on which of the two confusingly similar marks was used
first-disregarding the first use date of the earlier used mark since it was not confusingly
similar with the others." Id. The Ninth Circuit faced a similar situation in Brookfield and
also awarded priority to the intervening mark. Id. The language quoted above suggests that
if the intervening mark had been confusingly similar to the first mark, priority would have
been decided differently because the changes did not cause the confusion. The catch is that
the earlier marks in J. Wiss and in Brookfield were still in use, so a case of infringement
based on the earlier mark would not have required tacking. The proposal offered here would
permit tacking where the earlier version of the mark had been abandoned.
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
361.
There may be cases where confusion would also have existed before the mark was
362.
revised, but for different reasons. Suppose that a firm used the trademark FLYING
MONKEY for its hot sauce, then replaced it with WILD HORSE. In the meantime, another
hot sauce manufacturer adopted the name FLYING HORSE. FLYING HORSE might have
been confused with FLYING MONKEY, and FLYING HORSE might now be confused with
WILD HORSE, but the current confusion, based on the common term HORSE, is unrelated
to the former confusion, based on the common term FLYING. Although each firm is guilty
of causing confusion, the source of the current problem is the firm that most recently began
using HORSE. In such a case, tacking would not be permitted. See id.
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One objection to this approach is that the question of
confusion must be addressed before, or in conjunction with, the
question of seniority, meaning that cases could not be disposed of
quickly by considering only the latter. The likelihood of confusion
test does require consideration of a variety of factors and,
potentially, a wide range of evidence.36 3 One response is that if the
"same commercial impression" is a question of fact for the jury, as
the Supreme Court has determined that it is,364 it also demands
consideration of a broad range of evidence. 365 In fact, consumer
surveys may be even more necessary here than they are to
determine a likelihood of confusion. 366 Another response is that in
many cases courts already address confusion in addition to
seniority.3 6 7 A more serious objection to this approach is that it
requires the fact finder to consider a hypothetical situationwhether confusion would still have been likely if the mark had not
changed. Survey evidence might be needed to supply the answer.
A variation would be to ask not whether confusion would have
occurred if the mark had not changed, but whether the change
actually contributed to the confusion. A jury instruction for this
version might be expressed as follows:
Changes to plaintiffs trademark that occurred after
defendant's adoption of the mark accused of infringement
shall not affect plaintiffs status as the senior user unless the
changes contributed to the likelihood of confusion between
the marks.
Here tacking would not be permitted if the change made the
marks more similar, even if they might have been similar enough
already to cause confusion. Suppose we revise the events in the
earlier hypothetical so that a restaurant originally calling itself
363.
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
364.
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015).
365.
See Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013)
("Commercial impression ... should be resolved by considering a range of evidence, ideally
including consumer survey evidence.").
366.
See Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1074,
1079-80 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("[I]t is irrelevant that the 'likelihood of confusion' test for
infringement does not require consumer perception evidence." The "same commercial
impression" standard of tacking, being a 'far higher' standard, can "require a more
substantial evidentiary showing than infringement.").
367.
See, e.g., Nat'l Bakers Servs., Inc. v. Hain Pure Food Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 701,
707 (T.T.A.B. 1980); Permatex Co. v. Cal. Tube Prods., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 764, 767
(T.T.A.B. 1972); John Winkler's Sons, Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 442, 445
(T.T.A.B. 1972); Gulf States Paper Corp. v. E-Z Por Corp., 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 569,
579 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Hess's of Allentown, Inc. v. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
673, 677-78 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sekisui Chem. Co., 165 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 597, 606 (T.T.A.B. 1970); Laura Scudder's v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 136 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 418, 420 (T.T.A.B. 1962).
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TEXAS CHUCKWAGON BUFFET changed its name to TEXAS
CHUCKWAGON CAFt in a move to go more upscale. Prior to the
change, another restaurant adopted the name TEXAS COVERED
WAGON CAFE. This trademark might be confusingly similar to

TEXAS CHUCKWAGON BUFFET or TEXAS CHUCKWAGON
CAFPt, but it is more confusingly similar to the latter. When the
first restaurant changed its name, it created a greater potential
for confusion than already existed, perhaps failing in its
responsibilities as much as the other restaurant did when it
started using its name. On the other hand, if the change had been
the reverse-from TEXAS CHUCKWAGON CAFE to TEXAS
CHUCKWAGON BUFFET-then tacking would be allowed
(whether the "commercial impression" had changed or not),
because the marks were even closer before. This approach has the
advantage of being relatively easy to apply. In many cases, a court
could determine, as a matter of law and merely by comparing the
marks themselves, that the change in the trademark made it more
or less similar to that of the intervener.
Either variant would be firmly linked to the avoidance of
confusion-the concern that animates trademark law as a whole.
Neither would penalize firms simply for providing better
information to consumers, and neither would allow latecomers to
take advantage of trademark changes that have nothing to do with
the confusion for which they alone are responsible.
If tacking were based on a continuity of confusion rather than
a continuity of commercial impression, many cases would have the
same outcome. An alteration that does nothing to change the
commercial impression of the mark cannot contribute to its
potential to be confused with another mark. Hence, wherever
tacking has been permitted applying the current standard it
should also be permitted applying the proposed standard.3 6 8 In
many cases where tacking was not permitted because alterations
to the mark changed its commercial impression, the same
alterations are likely to have contributed to confusion with the
intervening mark. In ICON Solutions, for example, the change

from IKON CORPORATION to IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS not

only meant a "very different connotation," 369 it also meant a much
D&J Master Clean, Inc. v. Servicemaster Co., 181 F. Supp. 2d 821 (S.D. Oh. 2002),
368.
may be a case where tacking should not have been permitted under either standard. The
change from "ServiceMASTER" to "ServiceMASTER Clean" provided additional
information about the services offered, and therefore, according to the usual standards,
altered the commercial impression of the mark. See 181 F. Supp. 2d at 825. It also made
the mark more likely to be confused with the intervening mark, "Master Clean." Id.
ICON Sols. v. IKON Office Sols., No. 97-4178, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *22
369.
(E.D. Pa. June 12, 1998).
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greater likelihood of confusion with the intervening mark, ICON
SOLUTIONS. In American Paging as well, the change from
AMERICAN MOBILPHONE to AMERICAN MOBILPHONE
PAGING increased the potential for confusion with the rival
AMERICAN PAGING mark. 370 But in some cases tacking might
have been permitted under the proposed standard when it was not
permitted under the prevailing standard. In Key Corp, for example,
the change from KEY FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK to KEY BANK
& TRUST may have contributed nothing to the potential for
confusion with KEYBANK.3 71 In Van Dyne-Crotty, the marks

CLOTHES THAT WORK and CLOTHES THAT WORK FOR THE
WORK YOU DO may (or may not) have been equally likely to be
confused with CLOTHES THAT WORK HARD. 3 72
As discussed in Part II.F, the same tacking standard is
currently applied in a wide variety of contexts. In some of these,
there is no intervening mark with which to compare the earlier
and later versions of the altered mark. Here the exacting "same
commercial impression" standard may be desirable because the
changes in the mark must be considered in the abstract, not in the
context of any particular contest for priority. For example, if the
issue is whether a prior registration is sufficient to demonstrate
whether a similar mark has acquired secondary meaning, 373 it is
sensible to compare the two marks and see whether the message
contributed by the registered mark (brand origin) would be the
same message communicated by the revised mark. The impulse to
apply the same tacking standard in all contexts may be partly
responsible for missed opportunities in the three-trademark
situation, where one can examine the impact of the revisions in
terms of their contribution to any potential confusion.

370.
See Am. Paging, Inc. v. Am. Mobilphone, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2036, 2037
(T.T.A.B. 1989). The standard proposed here would not have changed the tacking permitted
in Laura Scudder's, but it would have made the result more defensible. BLUE BIRD and
BLUE ROBIN seem to have very different commercial impressions. Judge Rich might have
called the latter an "irritating" trademark - one that stands out because consumers do not
expect robins to come in blue. See Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 724, 862
n. 1 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (Rich, J., dissenting) (calling VORNADO an "irritating" mark because
it is similar, but not identical to, the commonly-encountered word "tornado"). On the other
hand, the earlier BLUE BIRD mark was closer than BLUE ROBIN to the intervening
BLUE BIRD mark, so if there was confusion after the change it would have been even worse
had no changes occurred. The change to BLUE ROBIN, in other words, was not responsible
for the confusion.
371.
See KeyCorp. v. Key Bank & Tr., 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 816 (N.D. Oh. 2000).
372.
See 926 F.2d 1156, 1156.
373.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Momentum is undoubtedly on the side of the current approach
to tacking. The "same commercial impression" standard has been
repeated countless times without criticism, and courts seem to
look for new ways to express how infrequently tacking should be
permitted. On the other hand, the current standard has no basis
in the Trademark Act or in Supreme Court precedent. 374 Perhaps,
following Hana, the Supreme Court could be persuaded to take a
closer look at the substance of tacking, and not merely the
mechanism for applying it. If it were to consider the fundamental
goals of trademark law-assuring accurate and useful information
for consumers, and protecting the investments of trademark
owners in their brands-the court might find the standard of
tacking to be due for reconsideration, with an expanded role for
the impact of trademark revisions on the potential for confusion.

374.
In Hana the parties did not dispute the applicability of the "same commercial
impression" standard. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 910 n.1 (2015).

